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Abstract 
 
 
 
We consider the impact of history on the survival of a monopolist selling single 
units in discrete time periods, whose quality is learned slowly. If the seller 
learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a sufficiently bad run of 
luck could induce her to stop selling. When she knows her quality, a good 
seller never stops selling. Furthermore, a seller with positive, though 
imperfect, information sells for the same number of periods whether her 
information is private or public. We further consider the robustness of the 
central result when the seller’s opportunities for strategic behaviour are 
limited. 
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1 Introduction
Reputation, reputation, reputation . . . Reputation is an idle and most false imposi-
tion: oft got without merit and lost without deserving
Othello, Act II, Scene 3
In the scene from which the above quote is taken, Cassio complains that he has lost his
reputation–the “immortal part” of himself–and is comforted by Iago. Iago essentially tells
Cassio that reputation does not have any meaning: good people can have bad reputations and
bad people can have good reputations. However, in a typical example of Shakespearean irony,
by the end of the play Iago is publicly revealed as the villain that he is and Cassio, who in
subsequent acts of the play tries to repair his reputation, ends up as governor of Cyprus. This
paper can be read as contrasting the stylised view of Iago, that good people can be unlucky and
that bad people can be lucky, with Shakespeare’s implicit view, that in the long run the truth
will out. Specifically, we find support for the latter view under certain circumstances; though
Iago’s viewpoint might prevail in the short-term, self-confidence signals quality and may partially
restore an inappropriately poor reputation.
We consider an optimal stopping problem in which, in every period, a monopolist provider
chooses whether to sell a single unit of a service or good, incurring a fixed production cost each
time that she does, or to stop trading. Initially the quality of the service is unknown to potential
buyers but each purchase yields additional information about the true quality. We consider
the problem, under diﬀerent assumptions concerning what the seller knows about her quality,
specifically we begin by examining feasible outcomes if she knows no more than buyers, and if
she knows her quality perfectly.
In the case where the seller has no additional information to buyers we show that in this
strategic setting, an analogous result to Rothschild (1974) emerges, that is that even though the
seller may have a good product, she might stop selling. This then oﬀers support to “Iago’s view”
as characterised above–that a good product can end up with a bad reputation.
However, introducing private information leads to a contrary result–when the seller knows
the quality of her product with certainty, then a good seller (one with a good product) sells in
every period–lending some support to “Shakespeare’s view”. The mechanism, which we term
“self-confidence” supporting this result has some intuitive appeal. A seller with a poor reputation
(that is one whose product buyers believes is quite likely to be bad) would be more willing to
sell, even at a low price, if she were good than if she were bad. This is because a good seller
would know that her reputation would most likely improve following future sales, and so would
be relatively more likely to accept a loss in the current period. As a bad seller would be relatively
more likely to cease trading if required to sell at a loss, it follows that simply being prepared
to sell at a “reasonable” price and exhibiting confidence that her reputation will improve, can
act as a signal of quality to buyers in the current period. This consideration changes the notion
of what price might be reasonable in the current period, since now buyers’ beliefs depend not
only on previous experience of the product but also on the observation that the seller is willing
to continue selling despite losses. In particular, this consideration leads to a higher reasonable
price, albeit one at which the seller would still expect a short-term, or myopic, loss.1
1The experience of bankrupts in Silicon Valley might provide anecdotal evidence of this mechanism in oper-
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Thus self-confidence, in the sense of accepting short-term losses for the sake of future expected
gains, can signal information and limit the losses that the seller need incur in any period. Indeed,
in the model these losses are limited to such an extent that a good seller will always wish to make
a sale. Moreover, this intuition and the qualitative result do not rely on the discount factor–
whenever a seller puts any weight on the future, a good seller who expects a better future than a
bad one prefers to continue selling. Note, however, that this mechanism is tempered to the extent
that a bad seller could mimic the well-founded self-confidence of a good one; formally this implies
semi-separation so that when the reputation is low enough, a good seller would always sell and a
bad seller would stop selling with some probability and continue selling with the complementary
probability. Indeed, this consideration suggests that no fully separating equilibrium is possible.2
We then proceed to test the appeal and robustness of the signalling equilibrium characterised.
First, in an extension of the model, where the seller’s information is not perfect but she has
more information than buyers, we show that self-confidence leads to an outcome whereby a
seller with positive information continues selling for just as long as she would have done if her
information had been public rather than private; thus a good private signal and a good public
signal are equivalent for the survival of a seller. Second, although the introduction of asymmetric
information leads to multiple equilibria, which we discuss at some length, we argue that the self-
confidence equilibrium we identify is the most appealing one in a well-defined sense–specifically,
natural restrictions on beliefs lead to uniqueness of this equilibrium as a limiting case in a richer
environment. We explore varying the seller’s opportunity to behave strategically by supposing
that she can only decide to continue or quit trading with some probability, so that an observation
that she continues trading need not reflect a deliberate decision, for example it may be that she
makes a mistake. In this scenario we derive qualitatively similar equilibria and show that as the
seller’s probability of having an opportunity to make a strategic decision tends to 1, the equilibria
(robust to natural restrictions on buyers’ beliefs) tend to the one discussed in the paragraphs
above and generated in the case where the seller always has the opportunity to make a decision
to continue or quit.
1.1 Related Literature
Our point of departure is a seminal paper on experimentation, Rothschild (1974), in which an
experimenter tries out diﬀerent arms of a two-armed bandit machine, where each arm pays out
a reward with some probability that is learned over time through trial. In each period, the
experimenter must weigh up both the short-term benefit and the information gained, which
will have a long-term value, from using one arm rather than the other. Rothschild’s startling
conclusion is that nothing guarantees that in the long-term the experimenter will end up choosing
ation. Apparently, in this environment, previous bankruptcies or failed ventures are not necessarily perceived
as an insurmountable obstacle to raising new finance. According to the mechanism described above, this might
be explained in part as lenders might perceive that only ‘high quality’ entrepreneurs would seek to start an-
other new enterprise, whereas ‘low quality’ entrepreneurs might have given up or been discouraged by previous
bankruptcy and the consequent higher costs of funds. The more common explanation is that lenders consider
that entrepreneurs who have suﬀered previous bankruptcies might have gained knowledge or skills through their
experiences and presumably learned from previous mistakes. These two explanations do not exclude each other
and both mechanisms might operate.
2See Tadelis (1999) who proves a no-fully-separating-equilibrium result in a similar framework.
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the right arm (that is the arm that is more likely to pay out the reward) and so ineﬃciency may
arise, even in the long run. In a simplified framework with only one arm which pays an uncertain
reward, we depart from Rothschild’s approach in making the arm–the seller in our model–a
much more active participant; we do this in two ways. First we allow the arm to make strategic
decisions–the decision of whether or not to continue trading–and so must apply game theoretic
techniques to analyse the problem; and secondly, we introduce asymmetric information.
The literature on experimentation and multi-armed bandits has developed in a number of
interesting directions; however, of most relevance to this paper is work which has taken a similar
approach to this paper in allowing the arms that are being experimented on a strategic role,
in particular Bergemann and Valimaki (1996) and Felli and Harris (1996). In these papers, the
strategic role is to vary the prices they charge for each trial. Although, considerably simplifying
the framework in a couple of respects (in this paper we consider a one-and-a-half armed bandit
problem rather than a two-armed problem and eﬀectively suppress any strategic role for the
experimenter), the innovation in this paper is the introduction of asymmetric information. Here,
we suppose that the seller either knows her own type perfectly or else at least has better infor-
mation than buyers, rather than supposing that learning and knowledge is symmetric among all
participants.
Ottaviani (1999), like this paper, considers a situation where a monopolist eﬀectively controls
the learning process. In common with most learning models though in contrast with this paper,
there is an assumption that there is no agent with perfect knowledge; however, Ottaviani consid-
ers privately informed buyers and focuses on social learning and the potential for informational
cascades where a monopolist optimally sets prices over time and the buyers learn about quality
by observing each other’s decisions to buy. In that environment, the monopolist initially prefers
prices that allow more transmission of information from current to future buyers, but eventually
either quits the market or captures it entirely. In contrast, we suppose that buyers learn about
quality by observing ex-post outcomes rather than purchases and focus on the monopolist’s deci-
sion to trade rather than her pricing decision. Another related paper is Judd and Riordan (1994),
which considers price signalling in the second period of a two-period model of a new product
monopoly and allows for private information both for buyers and sellers; in contrast, our focus is
on the introduction of a diﬀerent signalling mechanism–willingness to trade at a loss–which can
not arise in their model where there is an implicit assumption that there is always a non-trivial
eﬃcient level of trade.
Private information in this paper and the adverse selection that arises in this framework
brings this paper close to a wide literature on reputation and signalling. In particular, the self-
confidence mechanism used to generate the result that a good seller trades in every period is
similar to one contained in the model of Milgrom and Roberts (1986). In a two-period model
with heterogeneous consumers and free entry, they show that uninformative advertising can play
a role in signalling quality in the market for an experience good. Uninformative and costly
advertising in their model plays a similar role to the willingness to incur losses in this paper.
Tadelis (1999) presents a model with a similar framework to the one in this paper, in that
the only diﬀerence between a good seller and a bad seller is the probability with which they
produce a successful outcome. Tadelis, however, develops a model in a competitive environment
and focuses on shifts in the ownership of firms and the value of the firm’s name. In this paper,
we consider a monopolist seller and consider the influence of luck on her survival.
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1.2 Plan of the paper
In the following section, we introduce the framework for the models we go on to consider. In
Section 3, we suppose that the seller has no private information regarding her own type and show
that the outcome is equivalent to that described in Rothschild’s paper. In Section 4, we suppose
that the seller knows her own type perfectly; in this setting we present the central result of
the paper–that there is an equilibrium where a good seller always trades. A similar outcome is
obtained in the finite horizon case and eﬃciency is also discussed; in particular, lowering expected
profits at all reputation levels can allow arbitrarily close approximation to full eﬃciency.
The intuition of self-confidence underlying these results–essentially that a seller who knows
she is good values continuation more highly than a seller who knows she is bad–is extended
in two diﬀerent directions. First in Section 5, we suppose that the seller has an informative
private signal regarding her own type and demonstrate that a seller who had privately received
a high signal would survive (keep trading) for as long as a seller who had publicly received a
high signal. Secondly, in Section 6, we vary the degree to which the seller has opportunities to
behave strategically by supposing that in each period she can choose to cease trading only with
some probability. In this case, we characterise equilibria qualitatively similar to those derived
elsewhere. Moreover, we show that this class of equilibria is uniquely robust to a natural restric-
tion on buyers’ beliefs and argue that as the probability that the seller can behave strategically
tends to 1, these equilibria tend to a unique equilibrium–the one discussed in Section 4.
Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses further possible extensions.
2 The basic framework
Consider a monopolist seller of a good or service. The seller may be either a good quality seller
or a bad quality one.3 Both good and bad quality types incur a cost c in producing the good
and can produce either one unit or no units at each discrete time period. Each time that a
seller produces a good, it may turn out successful or unsuccessful with some probability.4 This
probability is independent and identical across time and depends only on the type of the seller.5
In fact, the two types of seller diﬀer only in that each time that a good seller produces a good,
3If quality is drawn from a continuum rather than restricted to two types, there is little substantive diﬀerence
in the conclusions. At some reputation levels, rather than the semi-separation of this paper in which a seller with
whom trade would be ineﬃcient ceases trading with some non-zero and non-unitary probability, there is a cut-oﬀ
level so that a seller whose innate true quality is below that threshold ceases trading for sure, and a seller whose
quality is above that threshold continues trading for sure.
4The restriction that the seller can produce only a single unit in each period is an important one, which is
fairly common in the experimentation literature. (For a paper on experimentation where quantity does play an
important role see Khilstrom et al (1984)). This assumption might seem reasonable if we think of the monopolist
seller as an expert selling her labour; here c would be interpreted as a reservation wage earned in alternative
employment.
5It is reasonable to think of the seller as producing a customised good, such as legal advice or auto-repair.
Although, the assumption that the probability of success in any period is independent and identically distributed,
is a strong one, which considerably simplifies the analysis, it is not critical for the results. It would be suﬃcient,
for example, that for any particular history a good type would be more likely to produce a success than a bad
type, that the likelihood of producing a success is non-decreasing in the number of previous successes and that
the stochastic processes generating successes for good and bad types are common knowledge.
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it will be successful with probability g and unsuccessful with probability 1 − g, whereas for a
bad type the corresponding probabilities are b and 1 − b, where 1 > g > b > 0. The seller is
risk neutral, and seeks to maximise the discounted present value of profits, where the per-period
discount factor is β ∈ (0, 1).6
Buyers are homogeneous and risk neutral, and at the beginning of period t, they share a
common belief that with probability λt the seller is good and with probability 1 − λt she is
bad–this belief is termed the seller’s reputation. Buyers assign a value of 1 to a success and 0
to a failure. Thus the ex-ante value of buying from a good seller is g and from a bad seller is
b. It is assumed that g > c > b, or equivalently that ex-ante trade with a good seller is socially
eﬃcient and trade with a bad seller is ineﬃcient. In each period, given their beliefs and the price
of the good, buyers decide whether or not to buy the good. We suppose that buyers buy only
once and that in each period there are at least two potential buyers.
In each period the seller first decides whether or not she will seek to trade. If she decided to
trade, the seller auctions a single unit of the good. Then this framework in which there is more
than one potential buyer, all buyers are homogeneous and buyers buy only once, ensures that the
seller extracts the full buyer valuation of her service.7 Further note, that we therefore exclude
any role for price signalling, we discuss the issue in the conclusion of the paper in Section 7 and
deal with it explicitly in Appendix 2.
The success or failure of the good can only be determined after it has been bought and
consumed. We suppose that this realisation is publicly observable. Although this realisation is
publicly observable, it is not verifiable so that contracts contingent on outcomes cannot be written
and so the price of the good in any period is independent of the outcome in that period, though
it varies with the history of the seller’s previous successes and failures. After this realisation has
been observed, the seller’s reputation is revised and the period ends.
Supposing that the seller begins with some initial reputation λ0, we can summarise the action
as the repetition of the following stages:
1. the seller begins the period with an initial reputation λt;
2. she decides whether or not to trade in this period;
3. on the basis of this decision beliefs are revised to the interim belief µt;
4. she then produces a single unit at a cost c and sells it, as discussed above, at a price
µtg + (1− µt)b;
5. the buyer then consumes the good and its realisation as a success or failure is publicly
observed; and,
6Note that for any discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) all the qualitative results derived below hold, though the discount
factor would eﬀect the level of the critical reputation levels discussed in the propositions below. However for
β ∈ {0, 1}, the qualitative results need not hold; in particular if β = 0, the game is eﬀectively a one-shot game
and dynamic reputational concerns are irrelevant, and if β = 1, there are potentially infinite future rewards.
7This assumption is analytically convenient; however it would be suﬃcient if the price of the good or service
depended only on the seller’s reputation, and was increasing in the seller’s reputation, such that for high enough
reputation the price would be higher than c and for low enough reputation it would be below c.
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6. on the basis of this realisation buyers revise their beliefs so that the seller’s end of period
reputation is λt+1 (if the seller did not trade in the period then λt+1 = µt).
Throughout we suppose that the information structure is common knowledge; for example in
Section 4, we suppose not only that the monopolist knows her own type, but that buyers know
that she knows her own type (though they do not know what this type) is, the monopolist knows
that they know and so on.
3 Uninformed seller
In this section, we suppose that the seller has no private information regarding her type. Instead,
her belief regarding her own type is identical to her public reputation; so the seller and potential
buyers share the same beliefs and update these beliefs identically. In deciding whether to stop
selling or not, the seller takes into account both the profit that she expects to earn in that period
and the value of the information generated in a further trial of her ability.
Following a success, or failure, the seller’s reputation λ is updated according to Bayes’ rule, so
that the reputation after a success and failure are given respectively by the following equations:
λs =
λg
λg + (1− λ)b (1)
λf =
λ(1− g)
λ(1− g) + (1− λ)(1− b) (2)
Symmetric information implies that the only factor that has an influence on a seller’s value
of trading is her current reputation. Using the equations above and recalling that at any time,
the seller can choose not to trade, it follows that an uninformed seller’s expected value of selling,
given a reputation λ, can be defined by the following equation:
V u(λ) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ β[(λg + (1− λ)b)max{0, V u(λs)} (3)
+(1− λg − (1− λ)b)max{0, V u(λf)}]
In this expression, λg + (1 − λ)b − c represents the profit in the current period. Future
expected profits, whether successful–max{0, V u(λs)}–or not–max{0, V u(λf)}–are discounted
at the discount rate β, and λg + (1 − λ)b represents the seller’s belief that the good will prove
successful. Finally note that since the seller can choose not to sell in any period, the value of
having the reputation λ is max{0, V u(λ)}.
In this environment, if there is a very low belief that the seller is good then the seller would sell
at a loss in the current period and would not expect much valuable information to be generated
by further trial–if her prior belief is close to 0 then the posterior belief derived as above according
to Bayes’ rule would not be much diﬀerent. Equivalently, at a suﬃciently low reputation, both
the current sale price and the option to continue selling will be so low as not to compensate the
seller for the cost of production. This intuition is formalised in the proposition below.
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Proposition 1 There exists a critical reputation level λu ∈ (0, 1), such that if the reputation at
the beginning of a period, λ, is greater than or equal to this critical level, that is λ ≥ λu, then
there is trade and if λ < λu, trade ceases.
Details of the proof appear in the appendix; however, the key elements of the proof involve
the use of standard recursive techniques to show that V u(λ) is a unique, well-defined, continuous
and increasing function. It can be readily verified that V u(0) < 0 and V u(1) > 0, and so by the
continuity and monotonicity of V u(λ), there is a unique λu, such that V u(λu) = 0. Since V u(λ)
is monotonically increasing in λ, it follows that for all λ ≥ λu, V u(λ) ≥ 0 so that the seller will
seek to trade, whereas for λ < λu, V u(λ) < 0 and the seller would prefer to stop trading. Note
that once the seller has stopped trading in one period, the decision that she faces in the next
period is identical, since no new information has been generated, so once the seller decides to
stop trading, she will never resume.
An important implication of the result is that even a good seller might stop trading in finite
time, this is because even a good type could suﬀer a run of such bad luck that it would drive her
reputation down below the critical level. Further note that λu can be thought of as an absorbing
barrier for reputation–if ever reputation falls below this level, the seller ceases trading.
As a final observation in this section, the problem described in this section is equivalent to a
special case of the two-armed bandit problem of Rothschild, with one safe arm (always paying c)
and one risky arm (which sometimes pays out 1 and sometimes 0, with a probability that can be
learned through experience). Therefore the level of experimentation (the number of periods that
a seller trades) in this problem would be identical to that in the one risky, one safe one-and-a-
half-arm bandit problem, though note that here it is the arm rather than the experimenter who
is strategic.
4 Perfectly informed seller
This section begins by presenting and proving the central result of the paper–that when the
seller is perfectly informed about her type, a good seller never stops selling. Underlying this
result is the mechanism that in equilibrium a seller’s self-confidence when she sells at a loss
acts as a signal of her quality. Throughout this section and indeed in the sections below, the
introduction of private information allows a multiplicity of equilibria in contrast to the unique
outcome that results in the case where the seller is uninformed. We discuss this multiplicity at
some length below. Nevertheless, at the end of Section 4.1 and in Section 6 below, we argue that
the equilibria we characterise in this section are appealing and robust equilibria.
4.1 The perpetual survival of a good seller in the infinite horizon
model
Intuitively, underlying the result in this section and indeed most of the other results below is the
observation that good sellers have more to lose from ceasing trade than bad sellers. In particular,
a good seller knows that by continuing to trade, her reputation is likely to be enhanced. Potential
buyers, who know that the seller knows her type perfectly, are aware of this and so take account
of the fact that the seller is willing to trade in assessing the likelihood that she is good.
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More formally, that a good seller prefers to continue trading relative to a bad type can be
seen clearly from a comparison of the Bellman equations for the value of a sale for a good type
and a bad type respectively.
V g(λ) = µg + (1− µ)b− c+ β[gmax{0, V g(µs)}+ (1− g)max{0, V g(µf)}] (4)
V b(λ) = µg + (1− µ)b− c+ β[bmax{0, V b(µs)}+ (1− b)max{0, V b(µf)}] (5)
Note that for a particular reputation, λ, the short-term profit is the same for a good or bad
seller; it is simply µg+(1−µ)b− c. It diﬀers from the short-term profit for an uninformed seller
(see Equation (3)), which is λg + (1− λ)b− c, since in the case where the seller is informed her
decision to trade is informative and so the buyers’ belief is conditioned on the fact that the seller
has traded. The interim reputation is revised to µ, which will be determined by equilibrium
strategies and beliefs and may diﬀer from λ.
The only diﬀerence between Equations (4) and (5) is that in the value function for a good
seller a future success is more likely than in the value function for a bad seller; it occurs with
probability g rather than b. Intuition suggests that for both good and bad sellers, the value of
a sale should be increasing in current reputation (V (λ) should be increasing in λ) so that, since
µs > µf , good sellers value continuation more highly than bad sellers do, at almost all levels of
reputation.8 In the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 below, this intuition is borne out and
these properties hold. Therefore, a bad seller would be more willing to drop out of the market
than a good one. Indeed we show that a good seller never drops out for any discount factor
β ∈ (0, 1). This is a consequence of the buyers’ knowledge that a good seller is relatively more
willing to incur a loss to continue trading, which induces a lower bound for the reputation of a
seller conditional on the fact that she has not ceased trading or, equivalently, a limit to how low
the sale price can fall.
For a given prior belief λt, if buyers believe that both good types and bad types would trade
for sure, then the interim belief is equal to this prior reputation, µt = λt. If however, it is believed
that bad types would drop out with some positive probability and good types would always stay
in the market then µt > λt. Equivalently, conditional on her remaining in the market, the seller
is more likely to be good. In particular, if it is believed that bad types always drop out at a
particular reputation level then µt = 1.
If in equilibrium, a bad type always stayed in the market, regardless of her current reputation,
then at some reputation levels the sum of the continuation value and the short-term profit would
be negative, since buyers’ beliefs could drop arbitrarily low. This could not be an equilibrium
strategy. At another extreme, if at some reputation levels, a bad seller would drop out for sure,
then buyers would assume that any seller seeking to trade must be a good type and so would be
willing to pay g at all periods in the future, a bad seller would then clearly prefer to stay in and
earn (g − c)/(1 − β), again this can not be an equilibrium.9 Thus it must be the case that, in
equilibrium, for some reputation levels a bad seller would drop out with some probability and
8The value functions for the good and bad sellers will take the same value if the reputation is either 0 or 1,
since in these cases future beliefs will stay at the initial level whatever happens.
9Note that, it is at this point that there will be a diﬀerence in Sections 5 and 6, where in equilibrium there
can be full separation of types (though note that in Section 5 a type is defined by the signal received rather than
innate ability). In essence this derives from the fact that in those environments, even if there is a full separation
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continue trading with the complementary probability. Such mixed strategies on the part of a
bad seller allows some continuity in the beliefs of buyers which is crucial for the existence of an
equilibrium of the form described below. In particular, in equilibrium a bad seller employs a
mixed strategy of continuing to trade that ensures that her value of continuing is zero. We state
the result formally in Proposition 2 below.
First, consider the value function for a bad type if buyers believed that sellers never stopped
trading regardless of type. This is implicitly defined by the following Bellman equation:
W b(λ) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ βbmax{0,W b( λg
λg + (1− λ)b)} (6)
+β(1− b)max{0,W b( λ(1− g)
λ(1− g) + (1− λ)(1− b))}
Note that in Equation (6), since buyers believe that all types always sells, the price in the
short-run is λg+(1−λ)b. It can be shown, that there is a unique solution to this Bellman equation
using the standard recursive techniques used to prove Proposition 1. Moreover, the solution
W b(λ) is a well-defined, bounded, continuous and strictly increasing function. Furthermore,
there exists a unique λ0 such that W b(λ0) = 0. Note, that λ0 depends on β, in particular λ0 is
decreasing in β. However, for any β, the following result holds.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the seller’s prior reputation is λ ∈ (0, 1). Then there is an equi-
librium, in which if λ ≥ λ0 trade occurs for sure–that is both a good and bad seller would trade
with probability 1. If λ < λ0, then a good seller trades for sure and a bad seller continues trading
with probability d(λ) and ceases trading with a probability (1− d(λ)), where d(λ) = λ(1−λ
0)
(1−λ)λ0 .
Essentially both good and bad types sell for sure at high reputation levels, that is above λ0,
but if her reputation falls then a bad type would cease trading with a mixed strategy (that is she
trades with probability d(λ)) such that she would be indiﬀerent between continuing to trade or
ceasing, and at this interim reputation a good seller strictly prefers to sell, which in equilibrium
she does. This result is illustrated in Figure 1, which represents a sample path for the reputation
of a seller (contingent on her willingness to sell). The reputation level λ0 acts as a lower bound
for the reputation contingent on selling. Thus for a good seller λ0 acts as a reflecting barrier and
for a bad seller it is a partially absorbing barrier. It is further worth noting that λ0 < c−b
g−b , where
this latter value is the reputation level that allows the seller to break even in the one period
game.10
(Figure 1 page 43)
The outcome characterised in this proposition is not the unique equilibrium outcome in this
environment. Other equilibria can be generated though they rely on specific (and arbitrary)
of types, there is still “noise” that allows Bayesian updating to continue and this leads to a region in the space
of reputations where there is full separation between diﬀerent types of sellers. See Sections 5 and 6 for further
details.
10In a one-shot game, a seller would behave identically whether good or bad, and would sell whenever the
profit–the diﬀerence between the sale price and the cost–was positive, that is when λg + (1− λ)b− c > 0.
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oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs. For example, if buyers believed that a good seller would always cease
trading whatever the current reputation, then there would never be any trade. This kind of
equilibrium is robust to the Cho and Kreps (1987) Intuitive Criterion, for example, since in the
environment of this paper the only diﬀerence between the two types of seller is with respect to
the frequency with which each type generates success, and at the ex-ante stage when the sale
price is determined, the profit realised depends only on buyers’ beliefs, so that arbitrary beliefs
would have exactly the same impact on a good seller as on a bad seller. However, equilibria
other than the one described in Proposition 2 above, do rely on specific oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs.
In the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 2, the only possible oﬀ-equilibrium actions are not
selling when reputation is high (since the only decision is whether or not to continue trading
and continuation is always an action that might be chosen in equilibrium) but such behaviour
does not require a response from buyers. Any other behaviour is equilibrium behaviour and so,
is not reliant on specific arbitrary oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs. Moreover, as shown in Section 6 the
equilibrium outlined in Proposition 2 is the unique outcome as a limit within a class of equilibria
robust to a natural restriction on beliefs–that the buyers’ belief contingent on observing that
the seller is willing to trade should be non-decreasing in the beginning of period belief–in the
more general environment considered in that section.
4.2 The finite horizon problem
In this section, we show that an analogous result to Proposition 2, which held in the infinite
horizon problem, applies in the finite horizon model (where there are only a fixed finite number
of opportunities to trade). The result for the finite case is somewhat altered in that in the last
period even a good seller may not trade, though in all previous periods a good seller would trade
with certainty. A good seller’s self-confidence underlies this result–the value of remaining in the
market and having further opportunities to trade is worth more to a good seller than to a bad one
and so a good seller is more willing to incur a short-term loss to remain in the market (except in
the last period where there is no continuation value). Again, this is recognised by buyers whose
beliefs are contingent on the observation that the seller has not yet ceased trading, and this sets
a floor to the losses that a seller need incur in order to continue trading, in such a way that a
good seller always trades (except possibly in the last period). Note, however that the level of
this eﬀective floor to reputation varies with the number of periods remaining. In particular, the
greater the number of periods remaining, then for any given reputation level the higher the value
of continuing for both types of sellers, and so the lower the eﬀective floor to reputation, which is
the level of reputation at which a bad seller is indiﬀerent between trading and stopping to trade.
These considerations are summarised in the proposition below; the proof of which is based on
backward induction and appears in the Appendix. Again, although the outcome described is not
a unique equilibrium, it does show that self-confidence is not reliant on an infinite horizon, but
can apply in a finite horizon problem. Moreover, the equilibrium described is the unique limit of
equilibria described in Section 6, which are uniquely robust to natural restrictions on beliefs.
Proposition 3 Suppose that there are N > 1 trading opportunities and that the current repu-
tation level is λ ∈ (0, 1), then there exists an equil;ibrium with the following characteristics. A
good seller sells with probability 1 whatever her reputation level. There exists a reputation level
λN such that a bad seller sells with probability 1 if λ ≥ λN . Otherwise a bad seller sells with
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probability less than one. Furthermore λN is decreasing in N . Finally if N = 1, then both a good
seller and a bad seller would behave in the same way, specifically they would sell if and only if
λg + (1− λ)b− c ≥ 0.
4.3 Eﬃciency
In this framework, an informed central planner, who knew the seller’s type and wished to max-
imise the total payoﬀs to the seller and the buyers, would ensure that there was trade if and only
if the seller were good. Although, all decision making is ex-ante eﬃcient in the sense of Holm-
strom and Myerson (1983), the lack of such a planner and the lack of information concerning the
seller’s type (in Section 3) or asymmetry of information (in Sections 4.1 and 4.2) can lead to two
types of ineﬃciency, or “errors” in trading:
Type I : No trade with a good seller.
Type II : Trade with a bad seller.
Thus the outcome in Section 3, analogous to the outcome in the Rothschild framework, suﬀers
from both types of ineﬃciency–the seller might stop selling even though she is good and a bad
seller might sell. The equilibrium characterised in Proposition 2 has no Type I ineﬃciency–a
good seller always trades–but suﬀers from Type II ineﬃciency–a bad seller would also trade
with some probability.
If there are lower potential profits available, for example if there were taxes or for some other
reason the seller could only appropriate a fraction of the buyer’s valuation, then the value to
having any reputation would be lower for both good and bad sellers. In particular, the lower
value for a bad seller suggests that the reputation threshold at which a bad seller would start
to stop trading would be higher, or equivalently that she would be (weakly) more likely to cease
trading at all reputation levels. This would reduce the risk of the potential Type II error. The
value for a good seller is almost always higher than the value for a bad seller, and so a good
seller would never cease trading, through the self-confidence mechanism described above, so that
as before there would be no Type I error. We formalise this intuition below in the specific case
where the seller can only recover a proportion of the buyer’s valuation.
Specifically, suppose that the seller keeps only a fraction γ of the price at which trade occurs.
Further suppose that γ ≥ c/g. (If this were not the case then even if it were common knowledge
that the seller were good it would still not be worthwhile for her to trade as her profit would be
γg− c < 0). Then as in Proposition 2, there is a natural equilibrium with no Type I ineﬃciency
and by choosing γ appropriately, the Type II ineﬃciency can be made arbitrarily small. Loosely,
the lower is γ, the lower the potential gains from trading for a seller whether good or bad,
therefore the higher the probability that a bad seller stops trading at any given prior reputation.
As before the continuation value for a good seller is higher than that for a bad one, so a good
seller is still willing to trade. Thus by reducing γ (equivalently increasing a per-unit tax), the
Type II ineﬃciency can be reduced and there is still no Type I ineﬃciency. This is made explicit
in Proposition 4 which is stated below and proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 Suppose that for a given interim reputation level µ, the seller’s revenue is γ[µg+
(1 − µ)b], with γ > c/g, then there is an equilibrium with the following characteristics. A good
seller always sells and there exists a λ0(γ) ∈ (0, 1) such that a bad seller sells with certainty if the
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prior belief λ ≥ λ0(γ) and sells with probability d(λ, γ) otherwise. Furthermore λ0(γ) is decreasing
in γ and d(λ, γ) is increasing in γ.
Note that λ0(γ) is decreasing in γ and d(λ, γ) is increasing in γ means that the lower the
proportion of the consumer valuation that the seller can appropriate, the more likely that a bad
seller would cease trading, and the greater the level of eﬃciency. In the limiting case where
γ = c/g, only good sellers would trade; such behaviour is rational, since there would be neither
profits nor losses in trading, so that continuing to trade is a rational strategy for a good seller,
and never trading is a rational strategy for a bad one.
5 Imperfect private information
In this section we consider an intermediate situation in which the seller has some imperfect
private information concerning her own type, which is superior to the information that buyers
commonly hold.
The self-confidence mechanism identified in the previous section operates in this more general
environment and leads to a more general result. A seller who has discouraging private information
regarding her own type will have a lower continuation value than a seller with encouraging
information, and therefore will be more likely to drop out in either a deterministic or probabalistic
sense at low reputation levels. This would imply that the interim reputation level–the reputation
contingent on the observation that the seller is self-confident, in the sense of being willing to
continue trading–would rise to the encouraged seller’s own assessment of her quality and would
reach this level before a seller with encouraging private information was induced to cease trading.
Thus for the survival of a seller with “good news” as to her type, there is an equilibrium in which
it does not matter whether this “good news” is publicly known or her own private information.
We illustrate this first in an infinite horizon setting, in which the seller receives information
regarding her type before any trading begins, refining the intuition discussed in the paragraph
above. Then we suppose that the seller keeps receiving informative signals as to her type through
time, but for the tractability of this problem, we analyse it assuming a finite horizon and a number
of natural restrictions on the evolution of the buyers’ and seller’s beliefs.
5.1 An informative signal at the beginning of time: infinite horizon
We suppose that before any opportunity for trading arises, the seller privately receives either a
high or a low signal. If she receives a high signal then she believes initially that she is good with
probability λ0 and otherwise bad, whereas if she receives a low signal the corresponding probabil-
ity is λ0, where 1 > λ0 > λ0 > 0. Furthermore, we assume that this signal is private information
and that initially the buyers have some belief, r0, such that buyers assign a probability r0 to the
seller having received a high signal and a probability (1− r0) to the seller having received a low
signal, so that λ0 = r0λ0 + (1 − r0)λ0. Thus the information set of the seller is superior to the
buyers’ information set.
In this environment, there are a number of diﬀerent beliefs to bear in mind, first as above
we denote the buyers’ belief that the seller is good λt. In contrast to Section 4, the seller is not
perfectly informed as to her own type and so revises her belief in the light of the success and
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failures that she realises. Thus the seller’s own belief that she is good depends on her history
and also on the signal that she received. We denote the belief at time t of a seller with a good
signal by λt and the belief of a seller with a bad signal by λt. Note that these beliefs are inter-
related and depend on a commonly observed history. Specifically, we assume that λ0, and λ0 are
common knowledge, so that for any history of successes and failures ht, all agents can calculate
λt(ht) and λt(ht), we further assume that r0 is common knowledge so that in equilibrium rt(ht)
and so also λt(ht) would be common knowledge.
In this environment, the seller does not have perfect information as to her type and revises
her belief that she is good in the light of previous history. It follows that even a good seller who
had a high signal might stop trading. She could have such a run of bad luck that buyers would
be fairly sure that she was bad (so that she would have to make significant short-term losses
in order to continue selling) and moreover she would herself be fairly certain that she was bad
so that she would consider it unlikely that her reputation would improve as a result of further
trading. However in this environment the self-confidence mechanism still applies. We discuss
this below.
First, consider the benchmark case in which the seller’s signal is public information. In this
case, the value function for a seller with a high signal is identical to the value function of the
uninformed seller defined in Equation (3), though the initial and subsequent beliefs depend on
the signal that the seller received, so that for a given history ht, the value of selling in this period
is given by V u(λt(ht)). Therefore, following Proposition 1, there is a critical reputation level λ
u,
such that as soon as λt(ht) < λ
u the seller with the high (public) signal stops selling. Note that
since λt(ht) can take any value in (0, 1) with an appropriate history, the set of histories, H, for
which a seller with a high (public) signal stops selling is not empty–this intuition is discussed
in the paragraph above.11
Now returning to the case where the seller’s signal is private information (though it is common
knowledge that she receives such a signal), there is an equilibrium in which a seller with a high
signal behaves in exactly the same way that she would if that signal were public. That is, there
is no distortion for the survival of a seller with a high signal between seeing that signal privately
and publicly. Equivalently, and somewhat more formally, where the seller’s signal is private
information, there is an equilibrium in which the set of histories that induce a seller with a high
signal to stop selling, PH, is exactly the same set of histories H that would induce a seller with
a high public signal to stop selling.
Proposition 5 There is an equilibrium in which the set of histories PH which induce a seller
with a high private signal to stop selling is identical to H, the set of histories that would induce
a seller with a high public signal to stop selling, that is PH = H.
The intuition underlying this outcome still derives from the high-signal seller’s self-confidence.
A seller with a high signal always prefers to continue selling than a seller with a low signal.
Therefore, the seller’s decision to continue selling is informative and aﬀects buyers’ beliefs, so
that these rise above the prior belief. However, the buyers’ belief can be no higher than if the
11Note that similarly a seller with a bad (public) signal will stop selling as soon as λt(ht) < λu; however, since
λ0 < λ0 and so λt(ht) < λt(ht) for all ht, this event would be sooner than for a seller with a good public signal.
Formally, if H is the set of histories which lead a seller with a bad (public) signal to stop selling, then H ⊂ H.
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buyers were certain that the seller had received a high signal, though it can reach this level. It
follows that PH = H. A more formal proof appears in the appendix.
A few other aspects of the equilibrium described in Proposition 5 are noteworthy. First note
that similar to the equilibria described in Section 4, there will be a range of histories for which
sellers who had received low signals will employ mixed strategies and continue selling with some
non-zero and non-certain probability. However, in contrast with those equilibria, a consequence
of imperfect private information is that there will be a range of histories for which sellers who
had received a high signal will trade with certainty and sellers who had received a low signal will
cease trading with certainty. We state this more formally, as follows.
Remark 1 There exists a non-empty range of reputation levels [λu,λ0(1)] for which there is full
separation of sellers in the sense that a high-signal seller with reputation λ ∈ [λu,λ0(1)] would
sell for sure and a low-signal seller with reputation λ ∈ [λu,λ0(1)] would cease trading for sure.
This follows since even if buyers believed that the seller had received a high signal, this would
not imply that she is good (this contrasts with the environment of Section 4) and so this may
not forestall short-term losses, and moreover a seller with a low signal would expect that her
reputation is relatively likely to deteriorate in comparison with a seller with a high signal and
so would still value continuation less than one with a high signal. A formal proof appears in the
Appendix.
Furthermore, as discussed above, there will be a range of histories after which a seller with
a high signal (and a fortiori a seller with a low signal) would cease trading. Finally, again
the equilibrium generating the outcome in Proposition 5 is not the unique equilibrium in this
environment, however in contrast to other equilibrium outcomes it is the only one not sensitive to
oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs. It is an equilibrium regardless of what buyers would believe if they were
to observe a seller continuing to sell following a history in PH (that is whether they would believe
that this shows that the seller had a low signal or a high signal or would have any intermediate
belief).12
Figure 2 page 43
Figure 2 illustrates the result characterised in Proposition 5. The result is that there is an
equilibrium in which public perception λ would converge to the self-belief of a seller who had
had a positive signal λ, before such a seller would cease trading (time C in the figure). This
follows because a seller who had had a negative signal would cease trading sooner. The low-signal
seller might cease trading with some positive probability as at A in the figure, so that the public
reputation would move closer to the belief of a seller who had had a good signal. Alternatively,
the seller with bad news might cease trading with certainty, as at B, so that the public reputation
(which is contingent on the seller continuing to trade) would be exactly equal to λ.
5.2 Seller learning over time: finite horizon
Intuitively, we conjecture that the result need not be confined to the case where the seller receives
private signals only at the beginning of time; rather, there is an equilibrium in which the seller
12See the discussion in the final paragraph of Section 4.1 for more on this issue.
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would continue trading whenever she has private information that would ensure survival in that
period if it were public. In order to keep the treatment simple, we state such a result in the finite
horizon version of the model, below. The proof of the result appears in the appendix.
We suppose that the seller keeps getting better information as to her own type and we term
this the seller’s self-belief or self-perception p and summarise the beliefs of the public and the
seller at the beginning of each period by (λ, p). We assume that the information available to the
public is also available to the seller, so that p is always more informative than λ and that if the
seller’s information was observed by the public, they would believe that the seller was good with
probability p. Consider the cumulative distribution function F (ν, q | µ, p) which characterises
the evolution of public reputation and self perception, given that just prior to consumption (that
is at the interim stage) these are given by (µ, p). Suppose that F (ν, q | µ, p) exhibits First Order
Stochastic Dominance with respect to p and µ, that is for any µ, if q > p then F (·, · | µ, q) first
order stochastically dominates F (·, · | µ, p) and for any p, if µ > ν then F (·, · | µ, p) first order
stochastically dominates F (·, · | ν, p), moreover we assume that R f(µ, q | µ, p)dq = 1 if and
only if µ = 0 or 1 and
R
f(ν, p | µ, p)dν = 1 if and only if p = 0 or 1 and that f(ν, p | µ, p) is
continuous in µ. Finally E(ν, q | p, p) = p and E(ν, q | µ, p) = (·, p).
First consider the problem in the case where, the public has access to all of the seller’s
information so that λ = µ = p always and consider the recursively defined:
U1(p) = max{0, pg + (1− p)b− c}
Un(p) = max{0, pg + (1− p)b− c+ βE[Un−1(q) | p]}
Thus Un(p) denotes the value of having reputation p when there are n remaining trading
opportunities. With this definition, we state the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Suppose that there are n > 1 remaining trading opportunities and the current
reputation and self-belief are given by (λ, p). Then there is an equilibrium which generates the
value functions Vm(λ, p) for m ≤ n which has the following property: If Um(p) > 0 and m > 1,
then Vm(λ, p) > 0 for all λ > 0.
Thus if the seller’s own self-perception p were suﬃciently high such that if it were pub-
lic knowledge then the seller would continue trading, then in the equilibrium described in the
proposition, the seller would continue selling even though p is private information, whatever the
seller’s public reputation (except the case where the public reputation is that it is certain that
the seller is bad).
The proof of the result proceeds by constructing strategies through backward induction. The
logic of the proof can not be transferred to the infinite horizon framework. The diﬃculty in prov-
ing the case for the infinite horizon model and with Markov strategies is that changing strategies
at one state aﬀects the value at all other states (so if we try and modify an equilibrium where
all drop out at one reputation level it aﬀects the equilibrium strategies at all other reputation
levels). The finite case is easier since here a state depends on both the reputations (public and
self-belief) and the time, so changing what happens in one state will not aﬀect anything that
happens after, only before, so we can proceed as in the Appendix by backward induction.
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6 Varying the degree to which the seller can behave strate-
gically
In this section, we further consider the robustness of the self-confidence mechanism introduced in
Section 4 and, in particular, the equilibrium characterised in Proposition 2. We introduce a more
general environment and a class of equilibria robust to natural restrictions on buyers’ beliefs and
show that the equilibrium characterised in Proposition 2 is the unique limit of equilibria among
that class of equilibria. Moreover, in the more general environment of this section the self-
confidence mechanism continues to operate.
We suppose throughout this section that the seller is fully informed as to her type, as in
Section 4, but we consider varying the degree to which the seller can act on her information–
that is varying her opportunity to behave strategically. Specifically, suppose now that in each
period the seller has the opportunity to cease trading not with certainty as before but only
with probability α. Further suppose that potential buyers can not observe whether the seller
continues trading out of choice or because she did not have the opportunity to cease. Thus α is
essentially a measure of how strategic the seller can be. If α = 0 then the seller has no decision
to make–both a good and a bad seller must keep selling forever. If α = 1, then the seller has
the opportunity to cease trading in every period (this is the case discussed in Section 4) and so
in a sense there is no limit to how revealing the observation that the seller continues trading can
be.
Akin to trembling hand refinements, 1 − α can be though of as the probability with which
the seller “makes a mistake” and continues to trade when it is not rational to do so.13 In this
case, however, we do assume that in all other periods the seller is rational to the extent of taking
into account her potential future fallibility.
For α = 0, there is no decision making and the outcome is unique and α = 1 is the fully
strategic case considered in Section 4. Suppose that α ∈ (0, 1) then we begin by stating the
following result, which characterises a seller’s behaviour when given the opportunity to make the
strategic decision to continue or cease trading.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium there exist reputation levels 0 < l < h < 1, such that if the prior
reputation is λ, then (i) if λ < l then both bad types and good types would cease trading, and (ii)
if λ > h then if given the opportunity both types would continue trading.
The intuition for this result is that beliefs cannot move “too fast”. In previous sections,
the interim reputation–the reputation contingent on the observation that the seller continues
to trade–could, in principle take any value between 0 and 1. Here it is related to the prior
reputation. If the seller’s reputation is high enough initially, then even if the seller has failures
from now on and buyers’ beliefs are as pessimistic as possible–that is buyers believe that when
given the opportunity only bad types would continue trading–then the current period reward
and a suﬃcient number of future periods’ reward would be high enough above cost to ensure that
either type of seller prefers to continue trading. Similarly, since beliefs cannot move too fast,
13Supposing that similarly there is a probability that the seller would cease trading when it is not rational to do
so would not change the qualitative results in this section, so long as we assume that once a seller stops trading
she cannot resume trading in later periods.
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if a seller has a very low reputation it takes a long time to recover even if things go as well as
possible; since the seller would be incurring losses in this time, she might prefer to cease trading.
We formalise this intuition in the Appendix, for one of the two cases (the other would have an
analogous proof), specifically we assume that there is no such l and show that this leads to a
contradiction.
In the sections below, we argue that natural restrictions on beliefs lead to particular classes of
equilibria, which in the limit converge to those described in Proposition 2 for the infinite horizon
case and Proposition 3 for the finite horizon version; though at α = 1, these restrictions are not
suﬃcient to ensure uniqueness.
6.1 Infinite horizon
We begin by making a couple of natural assumptions on buyers’ beliefs and argue that these lead
to a particular form of equilibrium. Specifically we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: Buyers’ interim beliefs are non-decreasing in their prior (beginning of period)
beliefs, i.e. µ(λ) is non-decreasing in λ.
We argue that under this assumption and for any α ∈ (0, 1) self-confidence leads to equilibria
of a particular form:
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium in which buyers’ beliefs satisfy Assumption 1, there exist values
0 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ m ≤ h ≤ 1 such that the seller makes strategic decisions to continue or cease trading
as follows:
• with prior reputations λ < k, both good and bad types would cease trading for sure;
• for k ≤ λ < l, a good type continues trading with some probability and a bad type would
cease trading for sure;
• for l ≤ λ < m, a good type continues trading for sure and a bad type would cease trading
for sure;
• for m ≤ λ < h, a good type continues trading for sure and a bad type would continue
trading with some probability that ensures that in equilibrium the interim reputation would
be h;
• for h ≤ λ, both types continue trading for sure.
The result follows since the assumptions imply that the value functions for both good and
bad types are increasing in the prior belief and that the value of any prior reputation is never
lower for a good type then for a bad type; these two properties of the value functions of good
and bad types ensure that any equilibrium must be of the hypothesised form.
Next we show that an equilibrium of this form does indeed exist, we do this by showing the
existence of equilibria within a subclass of the above form, for which k = l.
Proposition 7 For any α ∈ (0, 1), there exist 0 < l < m < 1 such that the following strategies
with associated beliefs form an equilibrium: when given the opportunity (a) with prior reputations
λ < l, both good and bad types would cease trading for sure (b) for l ≤ λ < m, a good type
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continues trading for sure and a bad type would cease trading for sure (c) for m ≤ λ < m/[m+
(1−m)(1−α)], a good type continues trading for sure and a bad type would continue trading with a
probability that ensures that in equilibrium the interim reputation would be m/[m+(1−m)(1−α)]
and (d) for m/[m+ (1−m)(1− α)] ≤ λ, both types continue trading for sure.
The formal proof of the result, the details of which appear in the Appendix, sets out Bellman
equations for the values of a good and bad seller which depend on how the interim reputation
is derived from the prior reputation (which is determined by the equilibrium beliefs). Standard
recursive techniques are then invoked to characterise properties of these value functions. Finally,
suﬃcient conditions to ensure equilibrium can be summarised as conditions on l andm, the proof
concludes in showing that these conditions can be satisfied with 0 < l < m < 1.14
Proposition 7 states that an equilibrium robust to Assumption 1 exists; however, many such
equilibria might exist. Loosely, this multiplicity arises at relatively low levels of prior reputation
within the range where a bad seller would not trade even if buyers beliefs were optimistic (that is
they believed that only good sellers choose to trade when given the chance). Within this range,
there are reputation levels where a good seller would be willing to trade if buyers were optimistic
but not if they were more pessimistic (that is if they believed that neither type would trade).
Thus either combination of beliefs and strategies would be mutually consistent and a multiplicity
of equilibria might arise. The intuition is somewhat complicated in as much as changing the good
seller’s equilibrium strategies in a range of reputations would change all other strategies, whereas
in the finite horizon version of the model, as discussed below, the eﬀect can be isolated within a
particular time period and so we can explicitly show the multiplicity of equilibria. However this
intuition does suggest that a multiplicity of equilibria exist.
We argue, however, that as α tends to 1, the limiting case is unique, moreover the unique
limiting equilibrium is the one characterised in Proposition 2. Note however, that in the case
α = 1, there are a multiplicity of equilibria of the form described, consistent with Assumptions
1 and 2. For example, in addition to the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 2, there is an
equilibrium where buyers have the oﬀ-equilibrium belief that only a bad type would seek to
sell at any reputation level, then µ(λ) = 0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1) and so is non-decreasing and the
equilibrium is of the hypothesised form with l = m = h = 1.
Proposition 8 As α tends to 1, the set of feasible equilibria of the hypothesised form (that is as
described in Lemma 2) converge to a singleton. Moreover, this is the equilibrium characterised
in Proposition 2.
The proof rests on showing that as α tends to 0, the set of feasible equilibrium l tends to {0}.
This is done by characterising an upper bound for this set (trivially the lower bound is 0) and
showing that this upper bound tends to 0. The details of the proof appear in the Appendix.
This result, that the class of equilibria which satisfy two natural assumptions–that buyers’
interim beliefs are non-decreasing in their prior beliefs and that buyers believe that the probability
with which a seller of either type sells is non-decreasing in her reputation–converges to the
14Note that if the prior reputation is m and buyers believe that a good seller would continue trading when
given the opportunity and a bad seller would stop, then the interim reputation would be m(α + 1− α)/[m(α +
1−α) + (1−m)(1−α)] = m/[m+ (1−m)(1−α)]. Further note that m is the lowest prior reputation for which
this interim reputation could be attained.
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equilibrium characterised in Proposition 2 makes a strong case for the earlier focus of the paper
on that result and the similar results discussed in earlier sections.
6.2 Finite horizon
We begin by arguing that the qualitative results shown for the infinite horizon, also apply in the
finite case.
First we argue that the finite horizon analogues of Assumption 1, together with another
natural assumption, restricts the set of feasible equilibria to equilibria of a similar particular
form in the finite horizon problem. Specifically we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 2: With n periods remaining, buyers’ interim beliefs are non-decreasing in their
prior beliefs, i.e. µn(λ) is non-decreasing in λ.
Assumption 3: Buyers believe that both types of seller behave identically in the final period.
Lemma 3 In the finite horizon model, in any equilibrium in which buyers beliefs satisfy As-
sumption 2 and 3, there exist values 0 ≤ kn ≤ ln ≤ mn ≤ hn ≤ 1 such that the seller makes
strategic decisions to continue or cease trading as follows:
• with prior reputations λ < kn, both good and bad types would cease trading for sure;
• for kn ≤ λ < ln, a good type continues trading with some probability and a bad type would
cease trading for sure;
• for ln ≤ λ < mn, a good type continues trading for sure and a bad type would cease trading
for sure;
• for mn ≤ λ < hn, a good type continues trading for sure and a bad type would continue
trading with some probability that ensures that in equilibrium the interim reputation would
be h;
• for hn ≤ λ, both types continue trading for sure.
In the Appendix we prove the result through backward induction, noting that Assumption
3 implies that in the final period good and bad sellers will choose to trade if and only if λ >
(c − b)/(g − b) and proceeding to show that this together with Assumptions 2 implies non-
decreasing value functions such that the value of a good seller for any reputation level is strictly
greater than the value to a bad one if there are more than one remaining trading opportunities,
implying that any equilibria must be of the hypothesised form.
Next we show that an equilibrium of the hypothesised form can exist.
Proposition 9 With n remaining trading opportunities, there exists an equilibrium defined by
parameters ln, mn and hn, and the following strategies and corresponding beliefs (a) λ ≤ ln then
both good and bad types would cease trading (b) if ln ≤ λ < mn then a good seller continues for
sure and bad would cease for sure (c) if mn ≤ λ < hn then a good seller continues for sure and a
bad would cease probabilistically so that the interim belief is hn and (d) if hn ≤ λ then both types
continue for sure.
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The intuition underlying this result again rests on the self-confidence mechanism which sug-
gests that a good seller would be more willing to continue trading at any reputation level than
a bad seller; the proof proceeds by inductively constructing an equilibrium of this form and can
be found in the Appendix.
For general α, there is a multiplicity of equilibria of the type characterised in Proposition
9. Note, however, that there is no multiplicity of equilibria of this type even with one period
remaining; in this case, it can be readily verified that the unique equilibrium of this form has
l1 = m1 = h1 =
c−b
g−b .
However, in the model with two or more remaining periods, multiplicity can arise. This
follows since a good seller will choose to continue trading so long as the expected value from
doing so is non-negative. This value depends only on the interim reputation and the same interim
reputation could be achieved with a relatively low reputation and optimistic beliefs (that is with
buyers believing that the good seller chooses to trade) or with a relatively higher reputation and
pessimistic beliefs (that is with buyers believing that the good seller would cease trading if given
the opportunity). Hence a multiplicity of equilibria can arise;15 though we argue that as α tends
to 1, the set of feasible equilibria converges to a singleton.
Proposition 10 As α tends to 1, the set of feasible equilibria of the hypothesised form (that is
as described in Lemma 3) converge to a singleton. Moreover, this is the equilibrium characterised
in Proposition 3.16
Thus we have shown that natural restrictions on beliefs lead to a particular class of equilibria,
similar to that considered for the infinite horizon case in the subsection above, and that as α
tends to 1, the set of feasible equilibria within this class tend to a singleton. Again, these results
lend further support for the earlier focus of the paper on the equilibria characterised in Sections
4 and 5.
7 Conclusion and further work
Returning to the quote from Othello at the beginning of this paper, we have found some support
for the view that the truth will eventually emerge in contrast to the alternative that luck plays the
critical role. Specifically, the central result of this paper is that a perfectly informed seller who
knows that her quality is good will always sell. This result is demonstrated in particular settings
and the self-confidence mechanism driving the result–that a good seller has more to gain from
continuing to trade because her reputation is relatively more likely to be enhanced rather than
to deteriorate–might be expected to have some wider application. In particular, self-confidence
has been shown to apply both in the finite and the infinite horizon cases, in the case where the
seller has information which, though imperfect, is more informative than the buyers’ knowledge
and in the case where the seller has limited opportunities for strategic behaviour.
An aspect which has been consciously avoided in the discussion above, is the issue of signalling
through mechanisms other than a willingness to trade. In particular, the pricing mechanism
outlined in the model–an auction amongst many buyers who buy only once–does not allow a
15See the Appendix for a specific example.
16The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 11 and so is omitted.
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role for price to be used as a signal. Allowing price a signalling role, for example, by allowing
the seller to make take it or leave it oﬀers, leads to a greater multiplicity of equilibria. However,
the equilibria described here would always be equilibria of such a model and as discussed in
Appendix 2, which deals with price signalling, a restriction on equilibria shows that the signalling
mechanism described here (signalling through a willingness to trade) and price signalling merely
complement each other.
Relaxing the assumption that all outcomes are commonly observable might prove an inter-
esting extension, either by supposing that the seller does not know whether the buyer perceived
the good as successful at all, or by supposing that the seller has some noisy information on this.
An approach towards considering this problem is to begin by returning first to the case where
the seller has no private information.
Finally it is of considerable interest to develop an analogue of a multi-armed bandit framework
in which a number of sellers are competing. As Bergemann and Valimaki (1996) and Felli and
Harris (1996) do, it seems natural to start with two sellers.
A first step in this direction might be to consider one seller whose type is common knowledge–
an incumbent–and a privately informed new entrant, whose quality may be better or worse than
the incumbent’s. The framework might further need to be altered so that there was a single buyer
buying in every period, while the sellers compete to sell a single unit in each period. Intuitively,
it seems reasonable to suppose that the mechanism underlying the results derived in this paper
could apply in this case as well. In particular, in equilibrium, the price that the incumbent
would charge in any period would be predictable. If a bad new entrant were prepared to match
the price/anticipated quality oﬀered by the incumbent, the new entrant would make a sale. In
contrast, if a bad seller were not prepared to sell with certainty, then following the logic of the
sections above, in equilibrium her strategy would be a mixed strategy, which left her indiﬀerent
between selling and not selling, though a good seller would always sell. The pricing strategies
in this environment may not be trivial to calculate, and, in particular, price signalling would
have to be considered. Multiplicity of equilibria would also arise in this context. Nevertheless,
following the logic developed in this paper it seems reasonable to believe that there are equilibria
in which a good entrant survives, and the approach of Section 6 and the uniqueness result which
arose in that context might be applicable here too. Such thinking should also apply to a case
with two sellers of privately-known quality, since in the long run the type of one of the sellers
will be known arbitrarily accurately, and thus the better of the two sellers should survive.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let B[0, 1] represent the set of bounded, continuous real-valued functions with domain [0, 1].
We begin by defining the operator S : B[0, 1] −→ B[0, 1] as follows:
S(f(λ)) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ β(λg + (1− λ)b)max{0, f(λs)} (A1)
+β(1− λg − (1− λ)b)max{0, f(λf)}
where λs and λf are as defined in Equations (1) and (2) above.
We then proceed as follows, first we prove that it is true that S : B[0, 1] −→ B[0, 1], next we
prove Blackwell’s two suﬃciency conditions for a contraction, which ensure that the contraction
mapping theorem applies and that there exists a unique solution to the recursive Equation (3).17
Finally we prove the that S takes increasing functions to increasing functions. That S preserves
continuity and is monotonically increasing is suﬃcient for ensuring that V u(λ) is continuous and
increasing. Putting these together we must show that:
1. S takes bounded, continuous real-valued functions with domain [0, 1] to bounded continuous
real-valued functions with domain [0, 1].
2. S satisfies monotonicity, that is for any f, h ∈ B[0, 1] with f(x) ≥ h(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]
then (Sf)(x) ≥ (Sh)(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1].
3. S satisfies discounting, that is there exists some constant α ∈ (0, 1) such that, (Sf)(x) +
αa ≥ (S(f + a))(x), for all constants a.
4. If f is such that f(λ) > f(µ) for all λ ≥ µ, then (Sf)(λ) > (Sf)(µ) for all λ ≥ µ.
We begin by proving the first point:
Let f be a bounded real-valued continuous function with domain [0, 1]. That S : B[0, 1] −→
B[0, 1] can be trivially verified. To show that (Sf) is continuous, given any x ∈ [0, 1] and ε > 0,
there must be some δ > 0 such that for all| x− y |< δ, | (Sf)(x)− (Sf)(y) |< ε. Consider first
any z ∈ [0, 1], then
| (Sf)(x)− (Sf)(z) |= | xg + (1− x)b− c+ β(xg + (1− x)b)max{0, f(xs)}
+β(1− xg − (1− x)b)max{0, f(xf)}
−zg − (1− z)b+ c− β(zg + (1− z)b)max{0, f(zs)}
−β(1− zg − (1− z)b)max{0, f(zf)} |
(A2)
| (Sf)(x)− (Sf)(z) |= | (x− z)(g − b)
+β(zg + (1− z)b)(max{0, f(xs)}−max{0, f(zs)})
+β(1− xg − (1− x)b)(max{0, f(xf)}−max{0, f(zf)})
+β(x− z)(g − b)(max{0, f(xs)}−max{0, f(zf)} |
(A3)
17See, for example, Ch. 3.2 (pp 49-55) Stokey and Lucas (1989).
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| (Sf)(x)− (Sf)(z) |= | x− z | (g − b)+
+ | max{0, f(xs)}−max{0, f(zs)} |
+ | max{0, f(xf)}−max{0, f(zf)} |
+ | x− z | (g − b) | max{0, f(xs)}−max{0, f(zf)} |
(A4)
Well by continuity of f , there exists some δ1 such that for all | x− z |< δ1, | max{0, f(xs)}−
max{0, f(zs)} |< ε
4
and | max{0, f(xf)} − max{0, f(zf)} |< ε
4
, and by the boundedness of f ,
| max{0, f(xs)}−max{0, f(zf)} |< M for some M .
So let δ = min{δ1, ε4 , ε4M , 1}, then for any | x− y |< δ
| (Sf)(x)− (Sf)(y) |< ε
4
(g − b) + ε
4
+
ε
4
+
ε
4M
M < ε (A5)
Thus S preserves continuity.
Next we turn to monotonicity. Suppose that f(x) ≥ h(x) for all x, then it follows that for all
x, max{0, f( xg
xg+(1−x)b)} ≥ max{0, h( xgxg+(1−x)b)}
and max{0, f( x(1−g)
x(1−g)+(1−x)(1−b))} ≥ max{0, h( x(1−g)x(1−g)+(1−x)(1−b))}. It follows that (Sf)(x) ≥
(Sh)(x).
Then we turn to the discounting condition.
(S(f + a))(x) = xg + (1− x)b− c
+β(xg + (1− x)b)max{0, f( xg
xg+(1−x)b) + a}
+β(1− xg − (1− x)b)max{0, f( x(1−g)
x(1−g)+(1−x)(1−b)) + a}
(A6)
So
(S(f + a))(x) 6 βa+ xg + (1− x)b− c
+β(xg + (1− x)b)max{0, f( xg
xg+(1−x)b)}
+β(1− xg − (1− x)b)max{0, f( x(1−g)
x(1−g)+(1−x)(1−b))}
(A7)
or equivalently (S(f + a))(x) 6 (Sf)(x) + βa which is precisely the discounting condition
since 0 < β < 1.
Finally we must show that S takes strictly increasing functions to strictly increasing functions.
Suppose that f is strictly increasing and that λ > µ. Consider (Sf)(λ)− (Sf)(µ).
(Sf)(λ)− (Sf)(µ) = (λ− µ)(g − b) + β(λg + (1− λ)b)max{0, f(λs)}
−β(µg + (1− µ)b)max{0, f(µs)}
+β(1− λg − (1− λ)b)max{0, f(λf)}
−β(1− µg − (1− µ)b)max{0, f(µf)}
(A8)
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(Sf)(λ)− (Sf)(µ) = (λ− µ)(g − b)
+β(µg + (1− µ)b)(max{0, f(λs)}−max{0, f(µs)})
+β(1− λg − (1− λ)b)(max{0, f(λf)}−max{0, f(µf)})
+β(λ− µ)(g − b)(max{0, f(λs)}−max{0, f(µf)})
(A9)
Since λ > µ, λs > µs and λf > µf , and so since f is increasing max{0, f(λs)} ≥ max{0, f(µs)}
and max{0, f(λf)} ≥ max{0, f(µf)} . Furthermore λs > µf , so max{0, f(λs)} ≥ max{0, f(µf)}.
Hence
(Sf)(λ)− (Sf)(µ) ≥ (λ− µ)(g − b) > 0 (A10)
Thus (Sf) is a strictly increasing function.
Finally note that V u(0) = b− c < 0 and V u(1) = g−c
1−β > 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2
First note that, the proof that W b(λ) is a well-defined, bounded, continuous and strictly
increasing function and that there exists a unique λ0, for which W b(λ0) = 0 is analogous to the
proof of Proposition 1 and so details are omitted.
We seek to show that the outcome and strategies can be supported as a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium in Markov stationary strategies. As discussed above, the sale price given interim
belief µ will be given by µg+(1−µ)b. Next note that all beliefs are consistent with the strategies
used and are updated according to Bayes’ rule. Suppose that λ < λ0 and the seller continues
to trade then, by Bayes’ law, the interim belief would be λ
λ+(1−λ)d(λ) = λ
0. With the good types
always trading and bad types trading according to the strategies given in the statement of the
proposition, it follows that in Equations 4 and 5, µ = λ for all λ ≥ λ0 and µ = λ0 for all λ < λ0.
It follows that the value for a bad seller of having a prior reputation λ is V b(λ) = W b(λ) for all
λ ≥ λ0, V b(λ) = 0 otherwise and that letting V g(λ) denote the value to a good seller of having
a prior reputation λ, V g(λ) > V b(λ) for all λ ∈ (0, 1), and in particular V g(λ) = V g(λ0) > 0 for
all λ < λ0.18
Therefore if the prior belief is λ ∈ (0, 1), if λ ≥ λ0, both good and bad types would want
to trade and if the reputation λ < λ0, given that buyers believe that these are the strategies
being played, the interim reputation will be λ0, so that a bad seller would be indiﬀerent between
entering or not and a good seller would want to enter. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
The case whereN = 1 is trivial. With both good and bad selling according to these strategies,
the price given entry is λg + (1 − λ)b, and so both good and bad do not want to deviate from
these strategies when λg + (1 − λ)b − c ≥ 0. When λ is such that λg + (1 − λ)b − c < 0, this
equilibrium can be supported by the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs for the buyers that if a seller does
seek to trade, then the belief conditioned on this information is equal to the prior belief λ.
Next consider the case where N = 2, following a similar approach to the infinite horizon
problem, we can write the value function for a bad seller if buyers believed that both types of
sellers always sold in the current period. This is W b2 (λ) which satisfies the following equation.
18Formally we should define V g(λ) and V b(λ) using appropriate Bellman equations and show that these equa-
tions have unique well-defined solutions. Such details are analogous to the corresponding details in the Proof of
Proposition 1 and are therefore omitted.
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W b2 (λ) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ β[bV b1 (λs) + (1− b)V b1 (λf)] (A11)
where V b1 (λ) represents the equilibrium value of having reputation λ with one period remain-
ing (so that V b1 (λ) = max{0,λg + (1− λ)b− c}.
We define λ2 implicitly as the value that satisfies W
b
2 (λ2) = 0; notice that λ2 will be uniquely
defined and that 1 > λ2 > 0. Then, a good seller’s strategy always to sell in this period and a
bad seller’s to sell with probability d2(λ) = min{1, λ(1−λ2)(1−λ)λ2} are equilibrium strategies.
Similarly, an inductive argument can show that, there is an equilibrium in which a good seller
always sells and a bad seller sells with probability one if her current reputation is greater than
or equal to an appropriately defined λN .
Finally to see that λN is decreasing in N , we prove this inductively, at the same time showing
that V bN(λ) is increasing inN in the range λ > λN and non-decreasing otherwise. These properties
can be shown easily for the case N = 2, and so we show only the inductive step. Again we define
W bN(λ):
W bN+1(λ) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ β[bV bN(λs) + (1− b)V bN(λf)] (A12)
by the assumed properties of V bN(λ), it follows that
W bN+1(λN) > λNg + (1− λN)b− c+ β[bV bN−1(λsN) + (1− b)V bN(λ
f
N)] (A13)
≥ λNg + (1− λN)b− c+ β[bV bN−1(λsN) + (1− b)V bN−1(λ
f
N)]
= V bN(λN) = 0
Thus W bN+1(λN) > 0, and since, as can easily be verified, W
b
N+1(λ) is increasing in λ, it
follows that λN+1 < λN . Then for λ ∈ (λN+1,λN ] V bN+1(λ) > 0 = V bN(λ) and for λ > λN , again
using the assumed inductive properties of V bN(λ) :
V bN+1(λ) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ β[bV bN(λS) + (1− b)V bN(λf)] (A14)
> λg + (1− λ)b− c+ β[bV bN−1(λS) + (1− b)V bN(λf)]
≥ λg + (1− λ)b− c+ β[bV bN−1(λS) + (1− b)V bN−1(λf)]
= V bN(λ)
so for λ ≥ λN+1, V bN+1(λ) > V bN(λ), and it can similarly be shown that for λ < λN+1, V bN+1(λ) ≥
V bN(λ). This concludes the inductive step and the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
The first part of the proposition–that for a given γ > c
g
there exists a λ0(γ) ∈ (0, 1) and
an equilibrium in which a good seller always sells and in this equilibrium, a bad seller sells with
certainty if the prior belief λ ≥ λ0(γ) and sells with probability d(λ, γ) otherwise–follows in an
identical fashion to the proof of Proposition 2. The details for this part are therefore omitted.
First to see that λ0(γ) is decreasing in γ, consider the following Bellman operator Sγ on
real-valued functions with domain [0, 1], defined as follows:
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(Sγf)(x) = γ[xg + (1− x)g]− c+ β[bmax{0, f(xs)}+ (1− b)max{0, f(xf)}] (A15)
Suppose that γ1 > γ2. Then (Sγ1f)(x) > (Sγ2f)(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that
W bγ1(λ) > W
b
γ2
(λ) where these are defined in a consistent way to the above notation, that is
where W bγ(λ) is the value of a sale to a bad seller if buyers believed that sellers did not stop
trading regardless of type and the seller appropriates a proportion γ of consumers’ valuation.
λ0(γ) is the unique solution ofW bγ(λ) = 0, and so sinceW
b
γ1
(λ) > W bγ2(λ) and these are increasing
functions, λ0(γ1) < λ
0(γ2).
19 Hence λ0(γ) is decreasing in γ.
Finally since d(λ, γ) = min{1, λ(1−λ0(γ))
(1−λ)λ0(γ)}, it is decreasing in λ0(γ), and λ0(γ) is decreasing in
γ, d(λ, γ) is increasing in γ. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5
We begin by writing down value of making a sale for a seller with a low signal, supposing
that buyers believed that the strategies of sellers with high and low signals were identical, so
that r0 = rt∀t. In this context, the buyers’ belief λt(r0, ht) as to the seller’s type, and the buyers’
belief r0 as to which signal the buyer received, are suﬃcient statistics for determining the seller’s
belief as to her own type λt(ht), since for all histories ht, jt such that λt(r0, ht) = λt(r0, jt) it will
be the case that λt(ht) = λt(jt). Therefore we can write the seller’s belief as a function of λt and
r0 and the value of a sale for a seller with a low signal given that buyers believe that she is good
with probability λ and that she received a low signal with probability r as follows.
W b(r,λ) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ β(λ(r,λ)g + (1− λ(r,λ)b)max{0,W b(r,λs)}
+β(1− λt(r,λ)g − (1− λt(r,λ)b)max{0,W b(r,λf)} (A16)
In a similar fashion to the proof of Proposition 1, it can be shown that this equation has a
unique well-defined solution which is continuous and increasing in λ. Moreover for each r, there
is a unique λ0(r) ∈ (0, 1) such that W b(r,λ0(r)) = 0. Furthermore, in a similar fashion to the
proof of Proposition 4, it can be shown that W b(r,λ) is decreasing in r (the intuition here is
clear, for a given λ, the higher the public belief that the seller had a high signal, the lower the
self-belief λ(r,λ) of the seller). This in turn implies that λ0(r) is increasing in r.
Let st be the buyers’ interim belief that the seller received a high signal, and as before let µt
denote the probability (as assessed by buyers) that the seller is good. Now consider the following
strategies:
• a seller with a high signal, continues selling with certainty as long as λt ≥ λu and otherwise
stops selling for sure;
• a seller with a low signal, continues selling with certainty as long as λt ≥ λ0(rt), otherwise
she continues selling with probability d such that µt(d,λt) = λ
0(st(d)). If µt(1,λt) <
λ0(st(1)), then she stops selling with probability one.
19The existence and uniqueness, continuity and monotonicity ofW bγ (λ) can be proved analogously to Proposition
1 and so details are omitted.
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Note that on the equilibrium path, by Bayes’ law st =
rt
rt+(1−rt)d . On the equilibrium path,
beliefs are determined according to Bayes’ law and oﬀ the equilibrium path, it does not matter
what beliefs are assigned, in particular we can assume that if buyers observe a seller selling where
µt(1,λt) < λ
u, then the buyers believe that the seller is good.20 It can be verified that these
strategies form a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, and that this equilibrium satisfies the property
outlined in the statement of the Proposition. ¥
Proof of Remark 1
Using the notation of the Proof of Proposition 5, we argue that λ0(1) > λu. This follows by
comparing W b(1,λ) and the value of selling for a seller with a high signal, who is believed to
have received a high signal V u(λ). Since λ(1,λ) < λ = λ(1,λ), it follows that W b(1,λ) < V u(λ)
for all λ and so λ0(1) > λu. Thus the range [λu,λ0(1)] is non-empty. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6
Note that Un(p) is an increasing function in p and that we can always define pn = inf{p :
Un(p) > 0} which is the lowest reputation which will ensure the seller continues trading.
We show that there is an equilibrium which generates the following properties, in addition to
the property described in the proposition.
For all (λ, p) in (0, 1)2:
1. Vm(p, p) ≥ Um(p);
2. Vm(λ, p) is non-decreasing in λ;
3. Vm(λ, p) is non-decreasing in p; and,
4. Vm(λ, p) is continuous in λ.
We generate appropriate equilibrium strategies inductively and show that they are indeed
equilibrium strategies and that they do indeed deliver the desired properties.
Well in the last remaining period, we have, irrespective of own belief, sell if λg+(1−λ)b−c ≥ 0,
then trivially this is an equilibrium and generates V1(λ, p) = max{0,λg + (1− λ)b− c}. This is
also non-decreasing and continuous in λ and in p, and V1(λ, p) = U1(p, p).
Inductive step: Then we proceed inductively and consider the nth stage:
Given the reputation level λ, the nth period strategy for each self-belief type(the strategies
at the remaining n− 1 periods are defined inductively) are given as follows:
Suppose that λg + (1 − λ)b − c + βE[Vn−1(ν, q) | λ, p] ≥ 0 for all p then the strategy for a
seller of any self-belief type p is to sell for sure.
Suppose that λg+ (1− λ)b− c+ βE[Vn−1(ν, q) | λ, p] < 0 for some p. Then let the strategies
be defined by the following. Let pn(λ) and dn(λ) be implicitly defined by the following: suppose
that when the public reputation is λ, all sellers with self-belief p < pn(λ) cease trading with
probability 1 and all sellers with self-belief p > pn(λ) continue trading with probability 1, and
those sellers with self-belief pn(λ) continue trading with probability dn(λ).
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20Then a fortiori if the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs place less weight on the seller having received a high signal,
neither kind of seller would still not want to continue selling.
21Note that in the case where self-belief is continuously distributed i.e. no mass points then we can ignore this
and set dn(λ) = 1 always.
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Then such strategies would induce an interim reputation µ which is the belief contingent
on the seller’s willingness to continue trading, With µ thus defined (and note that µ would be
lexicographic increasing in pn(λ) and dn(λ)) we can implicitly define pn(λ) and dn(λ) by the
equation:
µg + (1− µ)b− c+ βE[Vn−1(ν, q) | µ, pn(λ)] = 0. (A17)
Then the proposed strategies would indeed form an equilibrium.
It then only remains to show that (a) such a pn(λ) and dn(λ) exist and that (b) pn(λ) < pn =
inf{p : Un(p) > 0} and that (c) the other properties of the generated Vn(λ, p) hold. We consider
each in turn:
(a) Well as mentioned above µ is lexicographic increasing and continuous in pn(λ) and dn(λ).
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Furthermore we have that Vn−1(ν, q) is non-decreasing in ν; non-decreasing in q and continuous
in ν; this combined with the hypothesised FOSD properties imply that βE[Vn−1(ν, q) | µ, p] is
non-decreasing in µ, and non-decreasing in p; it is also continuous in µ since f(ν, q | µ, p) is
continuous in µ and Vn−1(ν, q) is continuous in ν. By the continuity of these functions it follows
that E[Vn−1(ν, q) | λ, p] is continuous in λ and so µg + (1 − µ)b − c + βE[Vn−1(ν, q) | µ, pn] is
continuous in µ; using this and the fact that λg + (1 − λ)b − c + βE[Vn−1(ν, q) | λ, p] < 0 and
g − c+ βE[Vn−1(ν, q) | 1, p] > 0 for all p gives us existence.
(b) We argue by contradiction suppose that this is not the case then it must be that µ > pn
and:
µg + (1− µ)b− c+ βE[Vn−1(ν, q) | µ, pn] ≤ 0 (A18)
but it also follows that
µg + (1− µ)b− c+ βE[Vn−1(ν, q) | µ, pn] > png + (1− pn)b− c+ βE[Vn−1(ν, q) | pn, pn] ≥ 0
(A19)
where the first inequality follows by the FOSD property and since Vn−1(ν, q) is non-decreasing
in ν and pn < µ, and the second inequality follows by definition of pn, so long as E[Vn−1(ν, q) |
pn, pn] ≥ E[Un−1(q) | pn] . This last inequality follows since we know that Vn−1(q, q) ≥ Un−1(q),
that E[ν, q | pn, pn] = (pn, pn) and E[q | pn] = pn and it is easy to verify that Vn−1(ν, q) is convex
in ν. Specifically:
V1(ν, q) is convex in ν
Suppose Vn−1(ν, q) is convex in ν
then claim Vn(aν + (1− a)λ, q) ≥ aVn(ν, q) + (1− a)Vn(λ, q)
22More formally, let the strategy set S(pn(λ), dn(λ)) be the set of strategies whereby all seller’s with self-
belief p < pn(λ) cease trading with probability 1 and all sellers with self-belief p > pn(λ) continue trading with
probability 1, and those sellers with self-belief pn(λ) continue trading with probability dn(λ). Then µ is a function
of this strategy set, and if we consider the composition of µ as a function of S and S as a function of pn(λ) and
dn(λ), then we can think of µ as a function of pn(λ) and dn(λ). Then µ(p, d) is increasing in p and in d; and if
p > q then µ(p, d) > µ(q, e) for any d and e, and any value of µ ∈ [λ, 1) is attainable through appropriate choice
of p and d.
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Well this follows so long as aµn(ν) + (1− a)µn(λ)) ≥ µn(aν + (1− a)λ)
Well since µn(ν) is continuous and a constant for ν low and then linear increasing, it is convex.
(c) Property 2 follows directly and the remaining properties follow from the observation
that for all λ’s which induce at least one self-belief type to cease trading with some non-zero
probability all give rise to the same interim belief µ. ¥
Proof of Lemma 1
We argue by contradiction, so suppose that given any ε there is some λ < ε such that either
good or bad (or both) will continue trading if given the opportunity with some probability.
However, since trivially an upper bound for the interim belief in the current period is λ
λ+(1−λ)(1−α)
(this is the belief contingent on all good sellers continuing to trade and all the bad ones who have
the opportunity ceasing), so an upper bound for the prior belief in the next period is λg
λg+(1−λ)(1−α)b
and so an upper bound for the interim belief in the next period is
λg
λg+(1−λ)(1−α)b
λg
λg+(1−λ)(1−α)b +
(1−λ)(1−α)b
λg+(1−λ)(1−α)b(1− α)b
=
λg
λg + (1− λ)(1− α)2b2 (A20)
and an upper bound for the prior belief in the period after is λg
2
λg2+(1−λ)(1−α)3b3 and so on. Since
these upper bounds on beliefs are increasing in time, so it follows that if it’s worth staying in
now it always will be with belief increasing in this way, so it must be that the upper bound for
the total reward of making a sale is bounded by
λ
λ+(1−λ)(1−α)g +
(1−λ)(1−α)
λ+(1−λ)(1−α)b− c+P∞
n=1 β
n( λg
n
λgn+(1−λ)(1−α)n+1bn+1g +
(1−λ)(1−α)n+1bn+1
λgn+(1−λ)(1−α)n+1bn+1 b− c) > 0
but the left hand side of the inequality is strictly less than
λ
λ+(1−λ)(1−α)g + b− c+
P∞
n=1 β
n( λg
n
λgn+(1−λ)(1−α)n+1bn+1g + b− c)
< λ
(1−λ)(1−α)g + b− c+
P∞
n=1 β
n( λg
n
(1−λ)(1−α)n+1bn+1g + b− c)
< λ
(1−λ)(1−α)g + b− c+
λ
(1−λ)(1−α)g
(1−α)b
(1−α)b−βg − (c− b)
1
1−β
for λ low enough this is negative which is the contradiction that we needed. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2:
We define the following value functions which depend on the buyers’ interim beliefs
V gα (λ;µ(.)) = gµ(λ) + (1− µ(λ))b− c
+β[gαmax{0, V gα (µ(λ)s;µ(.))}+ g(1− α)V gα (µ(λ)s;µ(.))
+(1− g)αmax{0, V gα (µ(λ)f ;µ(.))}+ (1− g)(1− α)V gα (µ(λ)f ;µ(.))]
and
V bα(λ;µ(.)) = gµ(λ) + (1− µ(λ))b− c
+β[bαmax{0, V bα(µ(λ)s;µ(.))}+ b(1− α)V bα(µ(λ)s;µ(.))
+(1− b)αmax{0, V bα(µ(λ)f ;µ(.))}+ (1− b)(1− α)V bα(µ(λ)f ;µ(.))]
Associated with these value functions, we can define Bellman operators Gµ and Bµ by
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Gµ(h)(λ) = gµ(λ) + (1− µ(λ))b− c
+β[gαmax{0, h(µ(λ)s)}+ g(1− α)h(µ(λ)s)
+(1− g)αmax{0, h(µ(λ)f)}+ (1− g)(1− α)h(µ(λ)f)]
and
Bµ(h)(λ) = gµ(λ) + (1− µ(λ))b− c
+β[bαmax{0, h(µ(λ)s)}+ b(1− α)h(µ(λ)s)
+(1− b)αmax{0, h(µ(λ)f)}+ (1− b)(1− α)h(µ(λ)f)]
Then it can readily be verified that both operators take non-decreasing functions to non-
decreasing functions, and that for any non-decreasing function h, Gµ(h) ≥ Bµ(h). It follows
that V g (λ | µ(.)), and V b (λ | µ(.)), which following standard recursive techniques are uniquely
defined, must be non-decreasing functions and V g (λ | µ(.)) ≥ V b (λ | µ(.)).
These facts, together with Lemma 1 imply that at least in a bottom range the value of having
a particular reputation is strictly greater than the value for a bad type. That the value for a good
type for a good type is strictly greater than the value for a bad type in some range (h, 1) and is
never lower than the value for a bad type, and given that with some non-zero probability given
any starting belief λ, the reputation will some stage enter (h, 1), it follows that the value for a
good type is strictly greater than the value of a bad type for all reputations in (0, 1).23 This and
the previously established result that the values of both good and bad types are non-decreasing
in the prior reputations imply that any equilibrium must be of the hypothesised form. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7:
We begin by introducing the following notation:
V gα (λ; l,m) = gµ(l,m) + (1− µ(l,m))b− c
+β[gαmax{0, V gα (µ(l,m)s)}+ g(1− α)V gα (µ(l,m)s)
+(1− g)αmax{0, V gα (µ(l,m)f)}+ (1− g)(1− α)V gα (µ(l,m)f)]
(A21)
and
V bα(λ; l,m) = gµ(l,m) + (1− µ(l,m))b− c
+β[bαmax{0, V bα(µ(l,m)s)}+ b(1− α)V bα(µ(l,m)s)
+(1− b)αmax{0, V bα(µ(l,m)f)}+ (1− b)(1− α)V bα(µ(l,m)f)]
(A22)
to represent the value to a good and bad type respectively of selling when the prior reputation
is λ, and the interim reputation is given by:
µ = λ for l < λ
µ = λ
λ+(1−λ)(1−α) for l ≤ λ < m
23Suppose that it is not the case that there is some reputation such that the reputation will never enter (h, 1)
well it must be that this initial reputation is strictly less than m. Let r be the highest such reputation, then it
must be that µ(r)s ≤ r. In particular it must be that µ(r) < r but by definition of µ(.) this cannot be.
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µ = h for m ≤ λ < h
µ = λ for h ≤ λ
where h = m
m+(1−m)(1−α) .
For an equilibrium to exist necessary and suﬃcient conditions are that there are values 0 ≤
l ≤ m ≤ 1, for which the following two conditions holds simultaneously:
(i) V gα (l; l,m) = 0
(ii) V bα(m; l,m) = 0
Note in particular, that if condition (ii) holds, it will also to follow that V bα(λ; l,m) = 0 for
all λ²(m,h].
Therefore, since these value functions can easily shown to be uniquely defined, continuous
and increasing in λ and that V gα (λ; l,m) > V
b
α(λ; l,m) using the standard recursive techniques
applied, for example, in the Proof of Proposition 1, it follows that the neither the good nor the
bad seller would have an incentive to deviate from their hypothesised strategies and this is indeed
an equilibrium. Moreover, note that standard techniques can be used to show that the value
functions are continuous in l and m.
Now from Lemma 1, it must be the true that any solutions for (l,m) will be interior. It
remains to show that such solutions exist.
We argue as follows, first note that trivially, V gα (0; l,m) < 0 for all l andm and V
g
α (1; 1, 1) > 0.
Thus by the continuity of V gα (λ; l,m), the set {λ : V gα (λ;λ,λ) = 0} is non-empty, let l = sup{λ :
V gα (λ;λ,λ) = 0}. Then for any m > l, since V gα (1; 1, 1) > 0, it must be that V gα (m;m,m) > 0.
Since, V gα (0; 0,m) < 0, V
g
α (l; l,m) is continuous in l and V
g
α (m;m,m) > 0, it follows that the set
{λ < m : V gα (λ;λ,m) = 0} is non-empty and we can implicitly define l(m) by l(m) = inf{λ < m :
V gα (λ;λ,m) = 0} and l(m) is continuous in m.
Then since V gα (l; l, l) = 0, and l is interior, it follows that V
b
α(l; l, l) < 0; in addition,
V bα(1; l, 1) > 0 for all l so by the continuity of V
b
α(λ; l, h) and of l(m) it follows that there
exists m > l such that V bα(m; l(m),m) = 0.
Thus there exist m and l(m) with V bα(m; l(m),m) = 0 and V
g
α (l(m); l(m),m) = 0–thus
conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied simultaneously, which is what is required for the existence of
an equilibrium. ¥
Proof of Proposition 8:
The bulk of the proof consists of showing that as α tends to 1, the set of feasible l tends to
the singleton {0}, this in turn implies a singleton feasible m consistent with equilibrium. It then
follows that as α tends to 1, the unique equilibrium outcome has k = l = 0 and m = 0, this is
precisely the equilibrium characterised in Proposition 2.
First, by Lemma 1, above, it is clear that for any α²(0, 1) a lower bound for l(α) is 0. We
claim that in the limit 0 is also an upper bound for l(α). We argue by contradiction, suppose
the claim is false, then there must be some ε > 0 such that there is no α with l(α) < ε for all
α ∈ (α, 1). Now note that the value of having prior reputation λ is always bounded below by
(1−α) b−c
1−β(1−α)+α.0–this is the probability of not having the opportunity to stop in the current
period multiplied by the value of having buyers convinced that the seller is bad from now to
eternity. Thus it follows that an upper bound for l(α) would be a λ satisfying:
λ
λ+ (1− α)(1− λ)g +
(1− α)(1− λ)
λ+ (1− α)(1− λ)b− c− (1− α)
c− b
1− β(1− α) = 0 (A23)
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but trivially as α tends to 1, it is clear that the λ solving this equation tends to 0. This is
the required contradiction which completes the proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3:
Assumption 3 implies that in the final period, good and bad sellers will choose to trade if
and only if λ > c−b
g−b . This implies that in the penultimate period the value of ending the period
with a reputation λ is strictly increasing in λ.24 This, together with Assumption 2, implies that
an equilibrium must be of the hypothesised form and such that for both good and bad types the
value of having a reputation λ is non-decreasing in λ and is strictly greater for a good type than
a bad type for λ ∈ (0, 1).
Similarly, by induction, when there are n remaining periods, any equilibrium must be of the
hypothesised form such that for both good and bad types the value of having a reputation λ is
non-decreasing in λ and is strictly greater for a good type than a bad type for λ ∈ (0, 1). ¥
Proof of Proposition 9: In the last period, there is an equilibrium of this form where
l1 = m1 = h1 =
g−c
c−b . Then we can proceed by constructing the equilibrium, proceeding by
backward induction. We show the inductive step.
For λ low enough neither type wants to continue trading, this follows from Lemma 1 and
earlier discussion. Then if beliefs are as optimistic as possible they will be that only a good type
seller would continue trading if given the opportunity. In some range, even with such generous
beliefs, a bad type won’t want to continue trading but a good type will, we suppose that a good
type will continue trading but a bad type will not. That such a range exists follows since the next
period value is increasing in λ for both types and is not lower for good type than for bad type.
Moreover it is negative for low enough reputations and positive for high enough reputations–
these properties hold for the final period value function and the backward induction described
here preserves these properties.
Then at some level with the most generous beliefs, as described above, a bad type would want
to trade, and so, following a similar argument to the paragraph above, the equilibrium would
require that a bad seller will employ mixed strategies, continuing to trade with a probability that
ensures that the interim reputation is at a level where she is indiﬀerent between continuing or
ceasing, and the good type would continue trading. Then at some point even if buyers believed
that bad types would continue trading with certainty, bad types would seek to trade–this point
characterises the lower bound, hn, of the highest range. ¥
Proof that a multiplicity of equilibria of the form described in Proposition can
arise in the 2-period case
Note that the value of ending the second period with reputation λ would be
βV1(λ,α) = β[αmax{0,λg + (1− λ)b− c}+ (1− α)(λg + (1− λ)b− c)} (A24)
Therefore the values of trading for a good seller and bad seller respectively, when beginning
the period with reputation λ are given by:
µ(λ)g + (1− µ(λ))b− c+ gβV1(µ(λ)s) + (1− g)βV1(µ(λ)f) (A25)
24Note that this follows, since even if the seller would choose to cease trading, she may not have the opportunity
and may be compelled to continue trading.
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µ(λ)g + (1− µ(λ))b− c+ bβV1(µ(λ)s) + (1− b)βV1(µ(λ)f) (A26)
It can be readily verified that there is a multiplicity of equilibria where l2 ∈ [l,max{l,m2}],
and m2 and h2 satisfy the following:
lg + (1− l)b− c+ gβV1(ls) + (1− g)βV1(lf) = 0 (A27)
l =
l
l + (1− l)(1− α) (A28)
h2g + (1− h2)b− c+ bβV1(hs2) + (1− b)βV1(h
f
2) = 0 (A29)
h2 =
m2
m2 + (1−m2)(1− α)
. (A30)
Note that the first of these equations characterise the prior reputation, l, at which if the
buyers beliefs were pessimistic that is they believe that a good and bad type seller behave
identically (both cease trading where possible) then a good seller would still be willing to trade.
l is the reputation at which a good seller would be willing to trade if buyers were as optimistic
as possible. In order to show that there is indeed a multiplicity of equilibria in this two-period
case, it is suﬃcient to show that l < m2. It can be easily verified that for the parameter values,
b = 0, g = 0.7, c = 0.5, β = 0.9, α = 0.5 that l = 0.59, h2 = 0.79 and m2 = 0.66 so that l < m2
and a multiplicity does indeed arise.
App endix 2: Price as a s ignalling d evice
In Sections 3 and 4 above, the potential signalling role of price has been suppressed through the
imposition of the assumption that competition among buyers and the sale procedure ensure that
the price of the good is always the full buyers’ valuation. Introducing this simplifying assumption
allowed us to focus on the signalling role of self-confidence, in the specific sense in this paper
of continuing to trade despite short-term losses. In this section, we relax this assumption and
modify the model presented in Section 2 by supposing that if the seller chooses to trade, she
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to one of the potential buyers.
In this context, in addition to deciding whether or not to continue trading, the seller also
chooses a sale price (up to the buyers’ valuation which is the most that a buyer would be
prepared to pay). Thus both the decision to continue trading and the sale price can have
signalling roles. In this environment, a plethora of equilibria are possible. This follows since the
seller’s action space, or the scope of her decision-making, increases significantly, and this can
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allow oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs a more critical role. Specific oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs can admit many
equilibria. Two extreme situations are of particular interest and highlight this observation.
First, in a no-trade equilibrium, buyers believe that any seller who trades and oﬀers a sale
price of more than or equal to b is bad. The strategies of the good and bad types of seller are
identical–they both cease trading.
In the eﬃcient trade equilibrium, the buyers believe that any seller who trades and oﬀers any
price other than c is bad and that a seller who trades and oﬀers a price c is good. The strategy
of a good seller (who is indiﬀerent between selling and not selling) is to sell at c in every period
and the strategy of the bad type (who is similarly indiﬀerent) is to cease trading.
These two equilibria point to two factors that lead to multiple equilibria and that are in
contrast to the equilibria characterised in Section 4. In particular, in those equilibria there is
always trade when trade is eﬃcient and trade is at a price such that the seller extracts the full
surplus from trading in that period. In general, neither of these two properties need hold for
an equilibrium in the scenario where the seller makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. In particular, no
trade can be supported, as demonstrated in the no-trade equilibrium, and if trade occurs, then
the price need not be the one that gives the seller all gains from trade–this merely defines a
maximum price at which trade could occur.25
It is worth noting that the equilibria described in Section 4 where price has no signalling
role can also be sustained as equilibria in the case where price does have a signalling role. For
example, consider the equilibrium described in Proposition 2. Trivially, this can be sustained
as an equilibrium in the case where price has a signalling role by assuming that oﬀ-equilibrium
beliefs are such that buyers believe that an oﬀer at a price other than that specified in Proposition
2 indicates that the seller is bad. However, an appealing feature of this equilibrium (and a
consequence of the fact that it is an equilibrium where price has no signalling role) is that
the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs need not be so severe. For example, the same equilibrium would be
maintained if buyers faced with an oﬀ-equilibrium choice of price do not change their beliefs–that
is they maintain the same belief as they held before observing the oﬀ-equilibrium price.
Appendix 2.1 The seller’s preferred equilibrium
In the spirit of the earlier sections, in which the seller extracted the full consumer surplus in each
period, in this section we seek to characterise the equilibrium that a good seller would choose if
she were able to. Note that if the seller who had the opportunity to choose which equilibrium to
play did not choose one preferred by a good type of seller, then she would reveal herself to be a
bad seller. So the focus on the equilibrium outcome preferred by a good seller seems appropriate.
Two important observations are first, and as discussed above, that the outcomes characterised
in Section 4 can be sustained as equilibrium outcomes where the seller makes take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers to buyers, and secondly, that these outcomes may not be the ones preferred by a good
seller. In particular, and as described below, it is the case that a good seller would strictly prefer
an equilibrium which at some low levels of reputations, entailed a price below the full consumer
valuation. Such a price would increase the probability that a bad seller ceases trading and so
25This is clear from considering the one-period game. For a given belief µ, the maximum price at which trade
can occur is given by µg+ (1− µ)b. However, a price p below this level can be sustained in equilibrium if buyers
believe that the strategies of both good and bad types are to sell at p and oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs are that any
higher oﬀer must be from a bad seller.
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might enhance the seller’s future prospects and result in a higher total expected value for the
seller, this is a kind of costly reputation-building. This intuition is formalised below.
We consider a finite horizon problem, and suppose that in each period the seller can impose
her preferred equilibrium, but is constrained in as much as the strategies that she proposes must
be dynamically consistent (that is if she has N periods to go, then she can only impose her
preferred equilibrium among the set of equilibria which entail preferred equilibria in all n < N
period subgames). The intuition behind this restriction is that if at every period the seller
can propose a new equilibrium, for such proposals to be credible, they must be dynamically
consistent. This restriction is close in spirit to the refinement that strategies in repeated or
dynamic games should be renegotiation proof, and leads to an analogous definition.26
Definition 1 In the 1 period game, a consistent preferred equilibrium is an equilibrium
which yields greatest profits to the good seller, suppose that this value is Y g1 (λ). Then for any
N > 1, suppose that {QN(λ)} denotes the set of expected payoﬀs that are feasible in an equilibrium
in which the continuation payoﬀs for a good adviser are given by Y gN−1(.), then we define Y
g
N(λ) =
max{QN(λ)}. An equilibrium is in the N-period game is a consistent preferred equilibrium
(CPE) if for every n 6 N , each n-period subgame with the prior buyers’ belief λ, yields an
expected value to a good seller of Y gn (λ).
We prove in the appendix that working with this definition and proceeding by backward
induction yields a unique equilibrium outcome, which is similar to that of Proposition 3 in that
a good seller always sells except possibly in the last period, and a bad seller either sells with
certainty or else stops selling with some non-zero probability.
Proposition 11 There exist constants pn and bλn such that in the N-period game there is a
unique CPE outcome, in which when there are n remaining periods and the seller’s reputation
at the beginning of the period is λ, then if λ < bλn a good seller sells with certainty, a bad seller
sells with some probability and the sale price is pn, and if λ ≥ bλn then both a good and bad type
would continue selling and the sale price is λg + (1− λ)b.
However, this consistent preferred equilibrium outcome diﬀers from the one characterised in
Proposition 3, in particular it is not always the case that the seller extracts the full consumer
surplus, in particular it may be that pn < bλng + (1 − bλn)b. This is because a good seller may
prefer to build her reputation in the sense discussed above. An interesting consequence is that
where Y bn (λ) is the expected value in the CPE outcome for a bad type with n periods remaining
and a reputation λ, then for some reputation levels, Y bn (λ) may decrease in n, the number of
remaining periods.27 Though it may at first seem counter-intuitive that at some reputation levels
a bad seller might prefer that there were fewer trading opportunities remaining, this result does
have some intuitive appeal. First recall that a bad seller must mimic the behaviour of a good
seller in order to continue trading and in order that she does not reveal herself to be bad. A good
seller eﬀectively has two potentially reasonable courses of action in any period. She can “milk”
her reputation–that is charge as much as the buyer is prepared to pay–though notice that even
26For definitions of renegotiation-proofness, see for example Benoit and Krishna (1993), Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991), Bernheim and Ray (1989) and Farrell and Maskin (1989).
27For example, at the parameter values g = 0.8, b = 0.3, c = 0.7 and β = 0.9, Y b1 (0.42) = 0.01, but Y b2 (0.42) = 0.
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when milking her reputation, the seller’s reputation will rise following a success. Alternatively,
she can build up her reputation by charging a lower price but one at which in equilibrium a bad
seller would be more likely to drop out. When there are more periods remaining, reputation-
building might be more attractive for a good adviser than reputation-milking, whereas a bad
seller would always prefer to be milking her reputation–any reputation building that a good
seller would do is credible only in that it makes continuing to trade less attractive to a bad seller.
Thus a bad seller might prefer that there are fewer remaining trading opportunities.
Appendix 2. 2 Pro of of Prop os ition 1 0
We make the following claims for the value for a good and bad seller of having a reputation λ
with n 6 N remaining trading opportunities in the CPE outcome:
• Y gn (λ) is (strictly) increasing in n and (weakly) increasing and continuous in λ;
• Y bn (λ) is (weakly) increasing and continuous in λ;
• There exist bλn, pn and Y gn such that:
— for all λ < bλn, Y gn (λ) = Y gn, Y bn (λ) = 0 and the sale price in the current period (if sale
occurs) is pn.
— for all λ ≥ bλn, then
Y gn (λ) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ βgY
g
n−1(λ
s) + β(1− g)Y gn−1(λf) (7)
Y bn (λ) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ βbY bn−1(λs) + β(1− b)Y bn−1(λf) (8)
Note that below we show that Y g1 = 0, so since we will show that Y
g
n (λ) is strictly increasing
in n and weakly increasing in λ, it follows that Y gn (λ) > 0 for n > 1, this can only be possible,
under the equilibrium strategies derived below, if a good seller always trades in any period n > 1.
We prove these claims inductively and hence prove the proposition.
n=1
In the one period case, the problem is trivial. In the CPE the current period price is the
maximum possible λg + (1− λ)b and there is trade so long as this realises non-negative profits,
that is so long as λ ≥ bλ1 = c−bg−b , here Y g1 = 0, p1 is arbitrary and Y g0 (λ) = Y b0 (λ) = 0∀λ.
Inductive step
Suppose that the claims hold for all m− 1 < N . For now we assume Y gm(λ)− Y
g
m−1(λ) > 0,
which as discussed above implies that a good seller always trades–we restate this claim and
prove it below as Lemma 4. Then, for any prior reputation λ, there are two possible equilibrium
outcomes in the period m + 1: where a bad seller always wants to sell, or where a bad seller
employs mixed strategies.28 We consider each of these two possibilities separately.
28Note that it cannot be the case that in equilibrium a good seller wants to trade for sure and a bad seller
wants to cease trading for sure, since in this situation a bad seller who did trade would be mistaken for a good
seller. So she would obtain the same value from trading as a good seller (the current and future belief of buyers
would be that the seller was good with certainty). However, since Y g1 (λ) ≥ 0 and by Lemma 8 Y gn (λ) > Y
g
1 (λ),
the value for a good seller is always strictly positive and so the bad seller would want to deviate and obtain this
positive value.
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First consider the case that the bad type always enters, then the value for a good seller is
given by:
p− c+ βgY gm−1(λs) + β(1− g)Y
g
m−1(λ
f) (9)
in this expression the current period p is feasible if and only if p 6 λg + (1 − λ)b and the
continuation payoﬀs in the next period, by the definition of the CPE, are given by Y gm−1(λ
s)
and Y gm−1(λ
f), and the future beliefs must be λs and λf for consistency with the hypothesised
equilibrium strategies that both good and bad sellers always sell. Furthermore, for this to be an
equilibrium, it must be true that29
p− c+ βbY bm−1(λs) + β(1− b)Y bm−1(λf) ≥ 0 (10)
This constraint ensures that it is rational for a bad seller to sell with probability one. Since
p− c+βgY gm−1(λs)+β(1− g)Y
g
m−1(λ
f) is increasing in p, its maximal value is attained when p is
at its maximal feasible value–that is when p = λg + (1− λ)b–and so in any outcome in which
the bad seller sells with probability one, this will be the sale price.
We define λm implicitly by the following equation
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λmg + (1− λm)b+ βbY bm−1(λsm) + β(1− b)Y bm−1(λfm) = 0 (11)
Then since Y bm−1(λ) is increasing in λ, for any λ ≥ λm, such an equilibrium outcome (in which
a bad seller would sell with probability one) is feasible.
Now, suppose that in the equilibrium, a bad seller would employ a mixed strategy, then the
value that a good seller can obtain is given by
p− c+ βgY gm−1(µs) + β(1− g)Y
g
m−1(µ
f) (12)
where µ is the interim reputation, so that if the strategy for a bad seller is to trade with
probability d, then µ = λ
λ+(1−λ)d , so that any µ ∈ [λ, 1) is attainable and for a current period
price p to be feasible, it must be that p 6 µg + (1 − µ)b. Furthermore, for employing mixed
strategies to be rational for a bad seller, it must be the case that
p− c+ βbY bm−1(µs) + β(1− b)Y bm−1(µf) = 0 (13)
29It must also be the case that
p− c+ βgY gn−1(λ
s) + β(1− g)Y gn−1(λ
f ) ≥ 0, this can be verified.
30Note we abuse notation and λm here is diﬀerent from λt which appears in Section 5.
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Consider the problem of maximising the expression in (12) subject to the constraint (13) and
p 6 µg + (1− µ)b. Substituting for p from (13), the problem can be recast as the maximisation
of
βgY gm−1(µ
s) + β(1− g)Y gm−1(µf)− βbY bm−1(µs)− β(1− b)Y bm−1(µf) (14)
subject to the relevant constraints. This will have a unique solution Y gm at µm, with an
associated pm. Furthermore, this value is attainable from any prior reputation λ 6 µ by an
appropriate choice of d. Furthermore µm ≥ λm, since by (13) and the fact that pm 6 µmg+(1−
µm)b and the assumed property that Y
b
m−1(λ) is increasing in λ, it follows that
µmg + (1− µm)b+ βbY bm−1(µsm) + β(1− b)Y bm−1(µfm) ≥ 0 (15)
Moreover since λm and p = λmg + (1− λm)b satisfy the constraint (13), it follows that
Y gm ≥ λmg + (1− λm)b− c+ βgY
g
m−1(λ
s
m) + β(1− g)Y
g
m−1(λ
f
m) (16)
From the assumed properties of Y gm−1(λ), λg+ (1− λ)b− c+ βbY bm−1(λs) + β(1− b)Y bm−1(λf)
is continuous and increasing in λ and so there exists a bλm ≥ λm such that Y gm = bλmg + (1 −bλm)b+ βgY gm−1(bλsm) + β(1− g)Y gm−1(bλfm).31
Finally it is a simple exercise to show that there is a CPE with bλm, pm and Y gm as defined
above and with both good and bad types always selling at a price that extracts full consumer
surplus for λ ≥ bλm, and otherwise at a sale price of pm with good types always selling and bad
types selling with a probability that induces the interim reputation µm and buyers beliefs such
that any oﬀ-equilibrium action must have been taken by a bad type, and moreover that the
appropriate hypothesised inductive properties do hold. ¥
Lemma 4 Y gm(λ)− Y
g
m−1(λ) > 0
Proof The proof strategy is to proceed by induction and for each m, to construct an equi-
librium in which strategies in any strict subgames form CPEs and which gives an expected value
Zgm(λ), such that Z
g
m(λ)− Y
g
m−1(λ) > 0. Then by definition Y
g
m(λ) ≥ Zgm(λ) and so the lemma
would be proven. It remains to prove the existence of such an equilibrium with such a payoﬀ.
n=2 Recall Section 4.2 and the two period version of Proposition 3, the equilibrium strategies
in this proposition and the induced value which we here denote Zg2 (λ) satisfy the hypothesised
properties.
Inductive step
Recall λm as defined in equation (11), we consider two cases separately and bλm as defined in
the paragraph below equation (16). First suppose that λm ≥ bλm−1, and then that λm < bλm−1.
Case I: λm ≥ bλm−1 First if λm ≥ bλm−1 then it is possible to construct an equilibrium which
entails CPE in all strict subgames and yields Zgm(λ) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ βgY
g
m−1(λ
s) + β(1−
31It is easy to verify that bλm 6 1 since it is easy to verify that it can not be the case that Y gm > (g−c)(1−βm+1)1−β .
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g)Y gm−1(λ
f) for λ ≥ λm and Zgm(λ) = λmg + (1 − λm)b − c + βgY
g
m−1(λ
s
m) + β(1 − g)Y
g
m−1(λ
f
m)
otherwise.
Then for λ ≥ λm,
Zgm(λ)− Y
g
m−1(λ) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ βgY
g
m−1(λ
s) + β(1− g)Y gm−1(λf)
−[λg + (1− λ)b− c+ βgY gm−2(λs) + β(1− g)Y
g
m−2(λ
f)]
= βg[Y gm−1(λ
s)− Y gm−2(λs)] + β(1− g)[Y
g
m−1(λ
f)− Y gm−2(λf)]
> 0
(17)
where the inequality follows from the hypothesised inductive property.
For λm > λ ≥ bλm−1
Zgm(λ)− Y
g
m−1(λ) = λmg + (1− λm)b− c+ βgY
g
m−1(λ
s
m) + β(1− g)Y
g
m−1(λ
f
m)
−[λg + (1− λ)b− c+ βgY gm−2(λs) + β(1− g)Y
g
m−2(λ
f)]
> λg + (1− λ)b− c+ βgY gm−1(λs) + β(1− g)Y
g
m−1(λ
f)
−[λg + (1− λ)b− c+ βgY gm−2(λs) + β(1− g)Y
g
m−2(λ
f)]
> 0
(18)
where the first inequality follows since Y gm−1(λ) is increasing in λ, and the second inequality
follows in analogous way to the inequality in (17).
Finally for bλm−1 > λ
Zgm(λ)− Y
g
m−1(λ) = λmg + (1− λm)b− c+ βgY
g
m−1(λ
s
m) + β(1− g)Y
g
m−1(λ
f
m)
−b[λm−1g + (1− bλm−1)b− c+ βgY gm−2(bλsm−1) + β(1− g)Y gm−2(bλfm−1)]
> bλm−1g + (1− bλm−1)b− c+ βgY gm−1(bλsm−1) + β(1− g)Y gm−1(bλfm−1)
−[bλm−1g + (1− bλm−1)b− c+ βgY gm−2(bλsm−1) + β(1− g)Y gm−2(bλfm−1)]
> 0
(19)
Case II: λm < bλm−1 Now it is possible to construct an equilibrium which entails CPE in all
strict subgames and yields Zgm(λ) = λg+(1−λ)b−c+βgY
g
m−1(λ
s)+β(1−g)Y gm−1(λf) for λ ≥ bλm−1
and Zgm(λ) =
bλm−1g + (1− bλm−1)b− c+ βgY gm−1(bλsm−1) + β(1− g)Y gm−1(bλfm−1) otherwise.
Then for λ ≥ bλm−1
Zgm(λ)− Y
g
m−1(λ) = λg + (1− λ)b− c+ βgY
g
m−1(λ
s) + β(1− g)Y gm−1(λf) (20)
−[λg + (1− λ)b− c+ βgY gm−2(λs) + β(1− g)Y
g
m−2(λ
f)]
= βg[Y gm−1(λ
s)− Y gm−2(λs)] + β(1− g)[Y
g
m−1(λ
f)− Y gm−2(λf)]
> 0
and for λ < bλm−1
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Zgm(λ)− Y
g
m−1(λ) = 1− bλm−1g + (1− bλm−1)b− c
+βgY gm−1(
bλsm−1) + β(1− g)Y gm−1(bλfm−1)
−[bλm−1g + (1− bλm−1)b− c
βgY gm−2(
bλsm−1) + β(1− g)Y gm−2(bλfm−1)]
> 0
(21)
This covers all possibilities and concludes the proof. ¥
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